Monday, February 1, 2010

Cognitive Science: Critiques and Challenges

Here's the last little chunklet for now. I'm grateful for the feedback I've been receiving on these draft bibliographies on the philosophy of cognitive science.

CRITIQUES AND CHALLENGES
Most work critical of cognitive science focuses on specific challenges, but Coulter (1982) and Thagard (2008) serve as discussions of many of the main challenges.

Coulter, J. (1982). Theoretical problems of cognitive science. Inquiry. 25 (1) 3-26.
A discussion of several of the main theoretical problems facing cognitive science from a broadly Wittgensteinian perspective.

Thagard, P. (2008). Cognitive Science. In E. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/cognitive-science
One of the sections is a brief overview of the main lines of critique of cognitive science.


CONSCIOUSNESS
Much of the concern about the adequacy of cognitive science to account for consciousness overlaps with concerns in the philosophy of mind about consciousness and its place in nature as conceived of scientifically. See the Oxford Online Bibliography *CONSCIOUSNESS *. One of the classic articulations of this sort of concern is Nagel (1974). Much of the general sorts of worry about the adequacy of physicalism in accounting for consciousness is gathered together in the widely discussed Chalmers (1996). An excellent and accessible discussion of the philosophy of consciousness as influenced by Chalmers can be found in Alter and Howell (2009). One of the most widely discussed attempts to give a cognitive scientific account of consciousness is Dennett (1991). See Dennett (1990) for a concise presentation for may of Dennett’s main considerations. For an excellent overview of the main problems of consciousness as well as an accessible presentation of a representational theory of consciousness, see Tye (1995). For excellent overviews of the main issues and theories, see van Gulick (2009) and Kriegel (2006).

Alter, T. A., & Howell, R. (2009). A Dialogue on Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
A concise and accessible overview of the main positions and problems in the current philosophical discussions of consciousness.
Chalmers, D. (1996). The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. New York: Oxford University Press.
A highly influential and widely discussed critique of the adequacy of physicalism for consciousness.

Dennett, D. C. (1990). Quining qualia. In W. Lycan (Ed.), Mind and Cognition (pp. 519-548). Oxford: Blackwell.
A concise overview of Dennett’s skepticism about qualia.

Dennett, D. C. (1991). Consciousness Explained. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.
A widely discussed attempt to give a cognitive scientific account of consciousness.

Kriegel, U. (2006). Consciousness, Theories of. Philosophy Compass, 1(1), 58-64.
An excellent overview of the main philosophical theories of consciousness.

Nagel, T. (1974). What is it like to be a bat? Philosophical Review, 83, 435-450.
A classic exposition of the worry that science may be inadequate for the subjective experience of consciousness.

Tye, M. (1995). Ten Problems of Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Terrific and accessible overview of the main problems of consciusness as well as a defense of a materialistic solution to those problems.

Van Gulick, R. (2009). Consciousness. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2009 Edition). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2009/entries/consciousness/
A terrific overview of the main issues concerning consciousness.

EMBODIMENT
For a classic defense of the embodied approach, see Varela et al (1991). For a defense of a modest embodiment thesis, see Clark (1997). For a defense of a self-described radical version, see Chemero (2009). Bourget and Chalmers (2009) is a frequently updated online bibliography on embodiment and situated cognition. Many of the entries contain abstracts and links to the full text of articles. See also the closely related entries under * ANTIREPRESENTATIONALISM AND DYNAMIC SYSTEMS *.

Bourget, D. and Chalmers, D. (2009). “PhilPapers: Embodiment and Situated Cognition”. http://philpapers.org/browse/embodiment-and-situated-cognition.
A frequently updated online bibliography, many entries of which contain abstracts and links to full text of articles.

Chemero, A. (2009). Radical Embodied Cognitive Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
A defense of a nonrepresentational, dynamical, ecological, embodied cognitive science.

Clark, A. (1997). Being There: Putting Brain, Body, and World Together Again. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
A highly readable defense of a modest version of the embodied approach.

Varela, F., Thompson, E., & Rosch, E. (1991). The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience: MIT Press.
A now classic defense of embodied cognition.

ANTIREPRESENTATIONALISM AND DYNAMIC SYSTEMS
The now classic source of the antirepresentational dynamic systems approach is due to van Gelder (1995). See also the anthology Port and van Gelder (1995). For criticisms of the antirepresentational dynamic systems approach, see Eliasmith (2001), Glymour (1997), and Grush (1997). For work on positions similar to the antirepresentational dynamic systems approach, see also the closely related articles under *EMBODIMENT*.


Eliasmith, C. (2001). Attractive and in-discrete: A critique of two putative virtues of the dynamicist theory of mind. Minds and Machines, 11 417-442.
A criticism of the dynamic systems theory approach to cognitive science.

Glymour, C. (1997). Goethe to van Gelder: Comments on ‘Dynamical Systems’ Models of Cognition [Electronic Version]. Retrieved June 5, 2008, from Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh PhilSci Archive: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00000139/
A rather cutting attack on the dynamical systems approach to cognitive science.

Grush, R. (1997). Review of Port and van Gelder's Mind as Motion. Philosophical Psychology, 10(2), 233-242.
A highly critical appraisal of the dynamic systems movement in cognitive science.

Port, R. & van Gelder, T. (1995). Mind as Motion: Explorations in the Dynamics of Cognition: MIT Press.
An anthology of articles exploring the antirepresentational dynamic systems approach to cognitive science.

van Gelder, T. (1995). What might cognition be if not computation? Journal of Philosophy, 92, 345-381.
A now classic philosophical defense of the antirepresentational dynamic systems approach.


AI SKEPTICISM
Skepticism about the feasibility of artificial intelligence (AI), has as its classic philosophical expositions, Dreyfus (1992) and Searle (1980). Searle’s famous Chinese Room argument is in Searle (1980) and various replies to it are reviewed in Cole (2009). One source of worry about the adequacy of AI approaches to cognition has to do with what has come to be known as the Frame Problem. See Shanahan (2009) for a review. For a sympathetic philosophical treatment of AI, see Haugeland (1989). An excellent anthology covering many of the main positions concerning AI is Haugeland (1997). Bourget and Chalmers (2009) is a frequently updated online bibliography on the question: Can machines think? Many of the entries contain abstracts and links to the full text of articles.

Bourget, D. and Chalmers, D. (2009). “PhilPapers: Can Machines Think?”. http://philpapers.org/browse/can-machines-think.
A frequently updated online bibliography, many entries of which contain abstracts and links to full text of articles.

Cole, D. (2009). The Chinese Room Argument. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2009 Edition). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2009/entries/chinese-room/
An excellent overview of the main responses to Searle’s famous Chinese Room argument.

Dreyfus, H. L. (1992). What Computers Still Can't Do. (3rd ed.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
A classic source of AI skepticism.

Haugeland, J. (1989). Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
A sympathetic philosophical treatment of AI.

Haugeland, J. (Ed.). (1997). Mind Design II: Philosophy, Psychology, and Artificial Intelligence. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
An excellent anthology covering the main positions concerning AI.

Searle, J. R. (1980). Minds, brains, and programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3, 417-457.
A classic source of AI skepticism, containing Searle’s famous Chinese Room argument.

Shanahan, M. (2009). The Frame Problem. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2009 Edition). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2009/entries/frame-problem/
An accessible review of the Frame Problem.