Supervenience and Neuroscience Online

My Synthese article, "Supervenience and Neuroscience" has been published online. Here's the SpringerLink link: [link]

Abstract The philosophical technical term “supervenience” is frequently used in the philosophy of mind as a concise way of characterizing the core idea of physicalism in a manner that is neutral with respect to debates between reductive physicalists and nonreductive physicalists. I argue against this alleged neutrality and side with reductive physicalists. I am especially interested here in debates between psychoneural reductionists and nonreductive functionalist physicalists. Central to my arguments will be considerations concerning how best to articulate the spirit of the idea of supervenience. I argue for a version of supervenience, “fine-grained supervenience,” which is the claim that if, at a given time, a single entity instantiates two distinct mental properties, it must do so in virtue of instantiating two distinct physical properties. I argue further that despite initial appearances to the contrary, such a construal of supervenience can be embraced only by reductive physicalists.

Keywords Supervenience - Physicalism - Neuroscience - Reductionism

William G. Lycan: Is Property Dualism Better Off than Substance Dualism?

William G. Lycan: Is Property Dualism Better Off than Substance Dualism?

During the last quarter-century, mind-body dualism has been doing surprisingly well: Campbell (1984), Swinburne (1986), Madell (1988), Robinson (1988, 2004), Hart (1988), Foster (1991), Seager (1991), Strawson (1994), Chalmers (1995), Taliaferro (1996), Bealer (1997), Stubenberg (1998), Griffin (1998), Hasker (1999), Rosenberg (2004), and others. But, with the notable exceptions of Swinburne, Hart and Foster, these dualists are merely property dualists rather than Cartesian substance dualists. They hold that some of our mental states have immaterial properties, but not that we ourselves are immaterial Cartesian souls entirely distinct from our bodies. The prevalent idea is that property dualism is tenable (or even demonstrated), but we are not crazy. I reject this disparity. I think that most of the standard objections to Cartesian dualism (CD) count as effectively against property dualism (PD), and that PD is hardly more plausible, or less implausible, than CD. Granted, assuming that a Cartesian ego would eo ipso have some immaterial mental properties, you might suppose that CD is logically stronger than PD; so one would need a reason for accepting CD over and above PD, and there must be at least one objection that applies to CD but not to PD. However, as we shall see, nonCartesian property dualism (PD & ~CD) faces at least two objections that CD does not.

Supervenience and Neuroscience

My paper "Supervenience and Neuroscience" has just today made the transition from sorta-mostly-accepted for publication in Synthese to totally-definitely-accepted for publication in Synthese. Many Brain-Hammer Heads were very helpful in suffering through earlier versions. Thanks, all y'all!

Here's a link to the latest version: [link].

Abstract: The philosophical technical term “supervenience” is frequently used in the philosophy of mind as a concise way of characterizing the core idea of physicalism in a manner that is neutral with respect to debates between reductive physicalists and nonreductive physicalists. I argue against this alleged neutrality and side with reductive physicalists. I am especially interested here in debates between psychoneural reductionists and nonreductive functionalist physicalists. Central to my arguments will be considerations concerning how best to articulate the spirit of the idea of supervenience. I argue for a version of supervenience, “fine-grained supervenience,” which is the claim that if, at a given time, a single entity instantiates two distinct mental properties, it must do so in virtue of instantiating two distinct physical properties. I argue further that despite initial appearances to the contrary, such a construal of supervenience can be embraced only by reductive physicalists.

Ectoplasmic Electron and the Ghost Beef

The results so far of my New Year's poll concerning whether cubes are necessarily physical is that 66.7% say they aren't. And I must admit I'm a bit shocked at the numbers.

I wonder how much depends on the specific example. So let's do this again, this time without cubes. How about electrons? Or five pounds of ground beef?

1. True or False? Necessarily, for all x, if x is an electron, then x is physical.
2. True or False? Necessarily, for all x, if x is five pounds of ground beef, then x is physical.

How many Brain-Hammer Heads think there are worlds with ectoplasmic electrons? Ghost beef?

Are cubes physical?

Sitting through several antireductionist talks at the Eastern APA made
me wonder about just how much divergence there is in contemporary
philosophers' intuitions about physicality. In the spirit of intuition
calibration, I am hereby surveying Brain-Hammer Heads on the following:

True or false? Necessarily, for all x, if x is cube (or approximately
cubic) then x is physical.