Philosophy of Cognitive Science at Oxford Bibliographies Online

Mandik, P. (2011). Philosophy of Cognitive Science. Oxford Bibliographies Online: Philosophy. doi: 10.1093/obo/9780195396577-0019

INTRODUCTION

Cognitive science is an interdisciplinary study of the mind loosely united by the idea that the mind is a computer. Philosophy is one of the main contributing disciplines (along with psychology, neuroscience, linguistics, and computer science), and many of its contributions concern the conceptual foundations of the separate disciplines (e.g., psychology and artificial intelligence), explorations of the relations between the disciplines (e.g., is psychology reducible to neuroscience?), and examinations of core uniting ideas (e.g., how best can we understand the idea that the mind is a computer?). Much contemporary philosophy of cognitive science overlaps with contemporary philosophy of mind. The present work tries as much as possible to focus on work peculiar to the philosophy of cognitive science, but the reader is advised to see pertinent work discussed in other Oxford Bibliographies Online articles, especially Metaphysics of Mind and Consciousness.

Cognitive Science: Critiques and Challenges

Here's the last little chunklet for now. I'm grateful for the feedback I've been receiving on these draft bibliographies on the philosophy of cognitive science.

CRITIQUES AND CHALLENGES
Most work critical of cognitive science focuses on specific challenges, but Coulter (1982) and Thagard (2008) serve as discussions of many of the main challenges.

Coulter, J. (1982). Theoretical problems of cognitive science. Inquiry. 25 (1) 3-26.
A discussion of several of the main theoretical problems facing cognitive science from a broadly Wittgensteinian perspective.

Thagard, P. (2008). Cognitive Science. In E. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/cognitive-science
One of the sections is a brief overview of the main lines of critique of cognitive science.


CONSCIOUSNESS
Much of the concern about the adequacy of cognitive science to account for consciousness overlaps with concerns in the philosophy of mind about consciousness and its place in nature as conceived of scientifically. See the Oxford Online Bibliography *CONSCIOUSNESS *. One of the classic articulations of this sort of concern is Nagel (1974). Much of the general sorts of worry about the adequacy of physicalism in accounting for consciousness is gathered together in the widely discussed Chalmers (1996). An excellent and accessible discussion of the philosophy of consciousness as influenced by Chalmers can be found in Alter and Howell (2009). One of the most widely discussed attempts to give a cognitive scientific account of consciousness is Dennett (1991). See Dennett (1990) for a concise presentation for may of Dennett’s main considerations. For an excellent overview of the main problems of consciousness as well as an accessible presentation of a representational theory of consciousness, see Tye (1995). For excellent overviews of the main issues and theories, see van Gulick (2009) and Kriegel (2006).

Alter, T. A., & Howell, R. (2009). A Dialogue on Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
A concise and accessible overview of the main positions and problems in the current philosophical discussions of consciousness.
Chalmers, D. (1996). The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. New York: Oxford University Press.
A highly influential and widely discussed critique of the adequacy of physicalism for consciousness.

Dennett, D. C. (1990). Quining qualia. In W. Lycan (Ed.), Mind and Cognition (pp. 519-548). Oxford: Blackwell.
A concise overview of Dennett’s skepticism about qualia.

Dennett, D. C. (1991). Consciousness Explained. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.
A widely discussed attempt to give a cognitive scientific account of consciousness.

Kriegel, U. (2006). Consciousness, Theories of. Philosophy Compass, 1(1), 58-64.
An excellent overview of the main philosophical theories of consciousness.

Nagel, T. (1974). What is it like to be a bat? Philosophical Review, 83, 435-450.
A classic exposition of the worry that science may be inadequate for the subjective experience of consciousness.

Tye, M. (1995). Ten Problems of Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Terrific and accessible overview of the main problems of consciusness as well as a defense of a materialistic solution to those problems.

Van Gulick, R. (2009). Consciousness. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2009 Edition). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2009/entries/consciousness/
A terrific overview of the main issues concerning consciousness.

EMBODIMENT
For a classic defense of the embodied approach, see Varela et al (1991). For a defense of a modest embodiment thesis, see Clark (1997). For a defense of a self-described radical version, see Chemero (2009). Bourget and Chalmers (2009) is a frequently updated online bibliography on embodiment and situated cognition. Many of the entries contain abstracts and links to the full text of articles. See also the closely related entries under * ANTIREPRESENTATIONALISM AND DYNAMIC SYSTEMS *.

Bourget, D. and Chalmers, D. (2009). “PhilPapers: Embodiment and Situated Cognition”. http://philpapers.org/browse/embodiment-and-situated-cognition.
A frequently updated online bibliography, many entries of which contain abstracts and links to full text of articles.

Chemero, A. (2009). Radical Embodied Cognitive Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
A defense of a nonrepresentational, dynamical, ecological, embodied cognitive science.

Clark, A. (1997). Being There: Putting Brain, Body, and World Together Again. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
A highly readable defense of a modest version of the embodied approach.

Varela, F., Thompson, E., & Rosch, E. (1991). The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience: MIT Press.
A now classic defense of embodied cognition.

ANTIREPRESENTATIONALISM AND DYNAMIC SYSTEMS
The now classic source of the antirepresentational dynamic systems approach is due to van Gelder (1995). See also the anthology Port and van Gelder (1995). For criticisms of the antirepresentational dynamic systems approach, see Eliasmith (2001), Glymour (1997), and Grush (1997). For work on positions similar to the antirepresentational dynamic systems approach, see also the closely related articles under *EMBODIMENT*.


Eliasmith, C. (2001). Attractive and in-discrete: A critique of two putative virtues of the dynamicist theory of mind. Minds and Machines, 11 417-442.
A criticism of the dynamic systems theory approach to cognitive science.

Glymour, C. (1997). Goethe to van Gelder: Comments on ‘Dynamical Systems’ Models of Cognition [Electronic Version]. Retrieved June 5, 2008, from Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh PhilSci Archive: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00000139/
A rather cutting attack on the dynamical systems approach to cognitive science.

Grush, R. (1997). Review of Port and van Gelder's Mind as Motion. Philosophical Psychology, 10(2), 233-242.
A highly critical appraisal of the dynamic systems movement in cognitive science.

Port, R. & van Gelder, T. (1995). Mind as Motion: Explorations in the Dynamics of Cognition: MIT Press.
An anthology of articles exploring the antirepresentational dynamic systems approach to cognitive science.

van Gelder, T. (1995). What might cognition be if not computation? Journal of Philosophy, 92, 345-381.
A now classic philosophical defense of the antirepresentational dynamic systems approach.


AI SKEPTICISM
Skepticism about the feasibility of artificial intelligence (AI), has as its classic philosophical expositions, Dreyfus (1992) and Searle (1980). Searle’s famous Chinese Room argument is in Searle (1980) and various replies to it are reviewed in Cole (2009). One source of worry about the adequacy of AI approaches to cognition has to do with what has come to be known as the Frame Problem. See Shanahan (2009) for a review. For a sympathetic philosophical treatment of AI, see Haugeland (1989). An excellent anthology covering many of the main positions concerning AI is Haugeland (1997). Bourget and Chalmers (2009) is a frequently updated online bibliography on the question: Can machines think? Many of the entries contain abstracts and links to the full text of articles.

Bourget, D. and Chalmers, D. (2009). “PhilPapers: Can Machines Think?”. http://philpapers.org/browse/can-machines-think.
A frequently updated online bibliography, many entries of which contain abstracts and links to full text of articles.

Cole, D. (2009). The Chinese Room Argument. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2009 Edition). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2009/entries/chinese-room/
An excellent overview of the main responses to Searle’s famous Chinese Room argument.

Dreyfus, H. L. (1992). What Computers Still Can't Do. (3rd ed.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
A classic source of AI skepticism.

Haugeland, J. (1989). Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
A sympathetic philosophical treatment of AI.

Haugeland, J. (Ed.). (1997). Mind Design II: Philosophy, Psychology, and Artificial Intelligence. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
An excellent anthology covering the main positions concerning AI.

Searle, J. R. (1980). Minds, brains, and programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3, 417-457.
A classic source of AI skepticism, containing Searle’s famous Chinese Room argument.

Shanahan, M. (2009). The Frame Problem. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2009 Edition). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2009/entries/frame-problem/
An accessible review of the Frame Problem.

Content, Imagery, Innateness, and Theory of Mind

Here are some more mini-bibliographies for the philosophy of cognitive science. Can you dig it?

THEORY OF CONTENT
Cummins (1989) is a short book that offers a terrific and concise overview of the main issues in this area. For another concise overview, see also Pitt (2008). Stich & Warfield (1994) collects articles by key figures discussing key positions. Perhaps the most widely held positions are varieties of causal and teleological theories of content. For up to date reviews, see Neander (2009) for teleological theories and Rupert (2008) for causal theories. For interesting critical appraisals of representation and theory of content see Cummins (1996) and Ramsey (2008). See also, Clapin (2002), which is organized around a series of exchanges between key figures.

Clapin, H. (2002). Philosophy and Mental Representation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Organized around a series of exchanges between key figures such as Dennett, Clark, Cummins, Haugeland, and Cantwell-Smith.

Cummins, R. (1989). Meaning and Mental Representation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
This short book supplies an excellent and accessible overview of key issues.

Cummins, R. (1996). Representations, Targets, and Attitudes. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
A highly informative critical appraisal of main theories of content and defense of Cummins own favored view.

Neander, K. (2009). Teleological Theories of Mental Content. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2009 Edition). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2009/entries/content-teleological/
An excellent and up to date overview of what is probably the most widely held of the theories of content.

Pitt, D. (2008). Mental Representation. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/mental-representation/
An excellent article-length overview of key issues.

Ramsey, W. (2007). Representation Reconsidered. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Critical examination of the mental representation, content, and related notions.

Rupert, R. D. (2008). Causal Theories of Mental Content. Philosophy Compass, 3(2), 353-380.
Excellent and up to date review of the varieties of causal theory of content.

Stich, S. P., & Warfield, T. A. (Eds.). (1994). Mental Representation: A Reader. Oxford: Blackwell.
Useful anthology representing key positions and key figures.

MENTAL IMAGERY
Thomas (2009) is a terrific article-length overview that also includes an annotated bibliography. One of the central debates about imagery of interest in the philosophy of cognitive science is the debate between pictorial views of imagery and description views. For an anthology covering this debate, see Block (1981). For representative defenses of the descriptive view, see Fodor (1975) and Pylyshyn (1981). For representative defenses of the pictorial view, see Kosslyn (1994), Rollins (1989), and Tye (1991).

Block, N. (Ed.). (1981). Imagery. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
An anthology covering the descriptive/pictorial debate.

Fodor, J. A. (1975). The Language of Thought. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Contains a classic defense of descriptivism.

Kosslyn, S.M. (1994). Image and Brain: The Resolution of the Imagery Debate. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
A very thorough presentation of scientific consideration in favor of the pictorial view.

Pylyshyn, Z.W. (1981). The Imagery Debate: Analogue Media Versus Tacit Knowledge. Psychological Review(88) 16-45.
A work by one of the key defenders of the descriptive view.

Rollins, M. (1989). Mental Imagery: On the Limits of Cognitive Science. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
A philosophical defense of a pictorial view.

Thomas, N. J. T. (2009). Mental Imagery. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2009 Edition). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2009/entries/mental-imagery/
A terrific and up to date overview of key issues. Also includes an excellent annotated bibliography. Highly recommended.

Tye, M. (1991). The Imagery Debate. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
A philosophical defense of a pictorial view.


INNATENESS
For an excellent and concise reviews, see Cowie (2008) and Griffiths (2009). Much contemporary cognitive scientific interest in innateness and nativism focuses on language, see especially, Cowie (2008). Contemporary concerns with innateness are continuous with a long historical tradition of debate over innateness. For an excellent review of the relevant history, see Samet (2008). For critiques of nativism, see Cowie (1998) and Prinz (2002). For a defense of nativism, see Fodor (1998). Bourget and Chalmers (2009) is a frequently updated online bibliography on nativism in cognitive science. Many of the entries contain abstracts and links to the full text of articles.


Bourget, D. and Chalmers, D. (2009). “PhilPapers: Nativism in Cognitive Science”. http://philpapers.org/browse/nativism-in-cognitive-science.
A frequently updated online bibliography, many entries of which contain abstracts and links to full text of articles.

Cowie, F. (1998). What's Within? Nativism Reconsidered. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
A critique of nativism.

Cowie, F. (2008). Innateness and Language. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2008 Edition). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2008/entries/innateness-language/
An excellent and up to date overview.

Fodor, J.A. (1998). Concepts: Where Cognitive Science went Wrong, New York: Oxford University Press.
A defense of nativism by one of its key defenders in the contemporary philosophy of cognitive science.

Griffiths, P. (2009). The Distinction Between Innate and Acquired Characteristics. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2009 Edition). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/innate-acquired/
An excellent and up to date overview.

Prinz, J.J. (2002). Furnishing the Mind: Concepts and their Perceptual Basis, Bradford Books/MIT Press.
A defense of empiricism.

Samet, J. (2008). The Historical Controversies Surrounding Innateness. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/innateness-history/
An excellent review of the historical philosophical significance of innateness.

SIMULATION V. THEORY THEORY
Two excellent reviews may be relied on to cover the opposing sides of this debate. Gordon (2009) presents the simulation side and is authored by one of the key proponents of that view. Ravenscroft (2008) presents the “theory” theory. Bourget and Chalmers (2009) is a frequently updated online bibliography on the theory of mind and folk psychology. Many of the entries contain abstracts and links to the full text of articles.

Bourget, D. and Chalmers, D. (2009). “PhilPapers: Theory of Mind and Folk Psychology”. http://philpapers.org/browse/theory-of-mind-and-folk-psychology.
A frequently updated online bibliography, many entries of which contain abstracts and links to full text of articles.

Gordon, R. M. (2009). Folk Psychology as Mental Simulation. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2009 Edition). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/folkpsych-simulation/
An overview of the case for holding that folk-psychological understanding is achieved via the simulation of the mental states of others.

Ravenscroft, I. (2008). Folk Psychology as a Theory. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/folkpsych-theory/
Concise overview of the considerations in favor of regarding folk psychological understanding as embodied as a theory.

Mini-bibliography of philosophy of neuroscience

I hereby continue serving up steamy draft chunks of my Oxford Bibliography on Philosophy of Cognitive Science. Now, with more brain flavor:

PHILOSOPHY OF NEUROSCIENCE
Though there’s considerable overlap with work in ELIMINATIVISM and REDUCTIONISM , in the past two decades philosophy of neuroscience has taken off as a subdiscipline of its own. Probably the most comprehensive of the article-length overviews is Bickle, Mandik, and Landreth (2006), but see also Brook and Mandik (2007). Anthologies of key works in philosophy of neuroscience are Bechtel et al (2001), Bickle (2009), Brook and Akins (2005), and Machamer, Grush, and McLaughlin (2001). Two excellent research monographs by philosophers of neuroscience are Bechtel (2008) and Bickle (2003).

Bechtel, W., Mandik, P., Mundale, J., & Stufflebeam, R. (Eds.). (2001). Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
A collection of both classic and newer works in the field.

Bechtel, W. (2008). Mental Mechanisms: Philosophical Perspectives on Cognitive Neuroscience. London: Routledge.
A research monograph presenting Bechtel’s distinctive take on the philosophy of neuroscience.

Bickle, J., Mandik, P., & Landreth, A. (2006). The Philosophy of Neuroscience [Electronic Version]. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2006 Edition), from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2006/entries/neuroscience/
The most comprehensive of the article-length treatments of the philosophy of neuroscience.

Bickle, J. (Ed.). (2009). The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
A wide ranging and up to date collection of articles by main key contributors to the area.

Bickle, J. (2003). Philosophy and Neuroscience: A ruthlessly reductive account. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic.
A research monograph presenting Bickle’s distinctive take on the philosophy of neuroscience.

Brook, A., & Mandik, P. (2007). The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Analyse & Kritik, 29(1), 3-23.
An overview of the philosophy of neuroscience that pays particular attention to issues concerning consciousness.

Brook, A., & Akins, K. (Eds.). (2005). Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
A collection of articles based on talks given at a conference dedicated to the topic.


Machamer, P., Grush, R., & McLaughlin, P. (Eds.). (2001). Theory and Method In The Neurosciences. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Of the philosophy of neuroscience anthologies, this one has perhaps the strongest leaning toward the philosophy of science (as opposed to the philosophy of mind).

ONTOLOGICAL STATUS OF COGNITIVE SCIENTIFIC AND FOLK-PSYCHOLOGICAL POSITS

Big "thank you"s are hereby transmitted to all of you who've already commented on the draft chunks I've been posting of my Oxford Bibliography on Philosophy of Cognitive Science. Here's the philcogsci version of the mind-body problem for your perusal:

ONTOLOGICAL STATUS OF COGNITIVE SCIENTIFIC AND FOLK-PSYCHOLOGICAL POSITS
The main positions discussed concerning the ontological status of the cognitive-scientific and folk-psychological posits among philosophers of cognitive science are functionalism, reductionism, and eliminativism (also known as eliminative materialism). (And functionalism is perhaps the most widely held position in the philosophy of cognitive science.) This general area is perhaps where the greatest overlap exists between the philosophy of cognitive science and the philosophy of mind, and the reader would do well to consult the Oxford Online Bibliography, *METAPHYSICS OF MIND*. For an article-length overview, see Lycan (2003). For an excellent, though avowedly contentious, book-length overview, see Rey (1997). For definitions of key relevant terminology in this area, see Mandik (2010).

Lycan, W. (2003). The Mind-Body Problem. In S. P. Stich & T. A. Warfield (Eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind (pp. 47-64). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
A brief overview of key ontological positions relevant to the philosophy of cognitive science.

Mandik, P. (2010). Key Terms in Philosophy of Mind. London: Continuum.
Dictionary containing many items of terminology of pertinence to key ontological positions in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of cognitive science.

Rey, G. (1997). Contemporary Philosophy of Mind: A Contentiously Classical Approach. Oxford: Blackwell.
Despite its avowedly contentious and classicist approach, an book-length treatment of key issues of relevance to the ontology of cognitive science and folk psychology.

ELIMINATIVISM
Though not the source of eliminativism (eliminative materialism), Churchland (1981) is one of the most discussed advocates of the position. Ramsey (2008) offers an excellent overview of the position, and key arguments for and against.

Churchland, P. M. (1981). Eliminative materialism and the propositional attitudes. Journal of Philosophy, 78, 67-90.
A classic. One of the most discussed sources of advocacy of eliminative materialism.

Ramsey, W. (2008). Eliminative Materialism. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/materialism-eliminative/
Excellent overview of key arguments both for and against.


REDUCTIONISM
One of classic defenders of reductionism (also known as the identity theory and the type-identity theory) is Smart, and his up to date (2008) offers an excellent overview. Polger (2009) is an excellent review of identity theories. Though a bit dated, Churchland (1986) is still a worthwhile sketch of empirical considerations in favor of a reductionist approach.

Churchland, P. M. (1986). Some reductive strategies in cognitive neurobiology. Mind, 95, 279-309.
A dated but worthwhile sketch of empirical considerations in favor of reductionism.

Polger, T. W. (2009). Identity Theories. Philosophy Compass, 4(5), 822-834. DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00227.x
An excellent review of key theories.

Smart, J. J. C. (2008). The Identity Theory of Mind. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/mind-identity/
An excellent overview by one of the key historical defenders of the position.

FUNCTIONALISM
One of the core features of discussion of functionalism is the closely related idea of multiple realizability. Levin (2009) is an excellent overview of the varieties of functionalism. Bickle (2008) and Funkhouser (2007) are both excellent in discussion of multiple realizability. For key historical sources of functionalism and multiple realizability considerations, see Fodor (1974), Putnam (1960), and Putnam (1967). For highly discussed sources of critique of functionalism, see Block (1980) and Block and Fodor (1972).

Bickle, J. (2008). Multiple Realizability. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/multiple-realizability/
An excellent overview of arguments concerning multiple realizability.

Block, N. (1980). “Troubles With Functionalism”, in Block, Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, Volumes 1 and 2. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 268–305.
A classic line of criticism of the adequacy of functionalist approaches.

Block, N., & Fodor, J. A. (1972). What psychological states are not. Philosophical Review, 81, 159-181.
An early classic source of criticism of functionalism.

Fodor, J. A. (1974). Special sciences, or the disunity of science as a working hypothhesis. Synthese, 28, 97-115.
An influential argument spelling out the autonomy of special sciences due to multiple realizability considerations.

Funkhouser, E. (2007). Multiple Realizability. Philosophy Compass 2(2), 303–315.
An excellent overview of key issues.

Levin, J. (2009). Functionalism. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2009 Edition). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2009/entries/functionalism/
An excellent discussion of the many varieties of functionalism pertinent to the philosophy of cognitive science.

Putnam, H. (1960). Minds and machines. In S. Hook (Ed.), Dimensions of Mind: New York University Press.
One of the key early sources of functionalism.

Putnam, H. (1967). The nature of mental states. In Capitan & Merrill (Eds.), Art, Mind, and Religion: Pittsburgh University Press.
One of the key early sources of functionalism.

Philosophy of Cognitive Architecture

I'm under contract to prepare the Philosophy of Cognitive Scienceentry for the new project, Oxford Bibliographies Online: Philosophy. Over the next week or so I'll be posting draft chunks so interested Hammer Heads can weigh in on any egregious omissions or regrettable inclusions. Below are the readings on cognitive architecture.

COGNITIVE ARCHITECTURE
Central issues concerning cognitive architecture concern the question of modularity (are distinct functions implemented in distinct modules) and the conflict between connectionists and those who favor the language of thought hypothesis (LOT). Davies (1989) touches on all three of these central issues. Aizawa (2002) discusses cognitive architecture primarily through examination of arguments for the classicist or language-of-thought-based approach. Eliasmith (2003) is primarily aimed an promoting his “Representation and Dynamics” theory, but manages along the way to provide an overview of key issues concerning the connectionism v. LOT debate. Eliasmith (2003) contains no explicit discussion of modularity.

Aizawa, K. (2002). Cognitive architecture. In S. Stich & T. Warfield (Eds.), Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Blackwell.
Accessible evaluation of key arguments in favor of the classicist language-of-thought approach to cognitive architecture.

Martin Davies (1989). Connectionism, Modularity and Tacit Knowledge. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (December):541-55.
An interesting discussion touching on the main philosophical issues of cognitive architecture: language of thought, connectionism, and modularity.

Eliasmith, C. (2003). Moving beyond metaphors: Understanding the mind for what it is. Journal of Philosophy, 100, 493-520.
A presentation of Eliasmith’s Representation and Dynamics theory that also manages to serve as an overview of connectionist and language-of-thought approaches to cognitive architecture.


CLASSICISM AND LANGUAGE OF THOUGHT
At the core of classicism (also known as symbolicism) is the language of thought hypothesis (LOT). Aydede (2008) is a top-notch discussion of LOT, and includes a section on the connectionism/classicism debate. Fodor is an iconic defender of LOT, and Fodor (1975) is a classic treatment. Fodor (2008) is the sequel.

Aydede, M. (2008). The Language of Thought Hypothesis. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/language-thought
An excellent discussion of the key issues, including the connectionism/classicism debate.

Fodor, J. A. (1975). The Language of Thought. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
The key defense by the most famous defender of the language of thought hypothesis. A classic.

Fodor, J. (2008). LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited Oxford: Oxford University Press.
The sequel to Fodor (1975).


CONNECTIONISM
The best of the bunch here, as far as covering key issues is concerned, are Bechtel and Abrahmsen (2002) and Garson (2008). Ramsey, Stich, and Rumelhart (1991) is an influential anthology. For more partisan treatments, Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988) is a classic source of skepticism about connectionism, and Churchland (1995) and Clark (1989) are sympathetic defenders of connectionist approaches. Chalmers and Bourget (2009) is a frequently updated online bibliography on connectionism. Many of the entries contain abstracts and links to the full text of articles.


Bechtel, W., & Abrahamsen, A. (2002). Connectionism and the mind: Parallel processing, dynamics, and evolution in networks (2 ed.). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
An excellent book-length overview of key issues.

Chalmers, D. and Bourget, D. (2009). “PhilPapers: Philosophy of Connectionism”. http://philpapers.org/browse/philosophy-of-connectionism.
A frequently updated online bibliography, many entries of which contain abstracts and links to full text of articles.

Churchland, P. M. (1995). The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
A presentation of a view of key issues about the mind and brain from a heavily connectionist-centric and neuro-centric point of view.

Clark, A. (1989). Microcognition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
An excellent monograph from a pro-connectionist.

Fodor, J. A., & Pylyshyn, Z. W. (1988). Connectionism and cognitive architecture. Cognition, 28, 3-71.
A classic source for skepticism about the merits of connectionism.

Garson, J. (2008). Connectionism. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2008 Edition). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2008/entries/connectionism
An excellent article-length overview of key issues.

Ramsey, W., Stich, S. P., & Rumelhart, D. M. (1991). Philosophy and Connectionist Theory. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
An influential anthology collecting articles by key figures.

MODULARITY
Robbins (2009) is an excellent overview of key issues. Much philosophical discussion of modularity concerns claims made by Fodor on behalf of modularity. Fodor (1983) is a classic source. Churchland (1988) is a classic critique. Chalmers and Bourget (2009) is a frequently updated online bibliography on modularity in cognitive science. Many of the entries contain abstracts and links to the full text of articles.

Chalmers, D. and Bourget, D. (2009). “PhilPapers: Modularity in Cognitive Science”. http://philpapers.org/browse/modularity-in-cognitive-science.
A frequently updated online bibliography, many entries of which contain abstracts and links to full text of articles.

Churchland, P. M. (1988). Perceptual plasticity and theoretical neutrality: A reply to Jerry Fodor. Philosophy of Science, 55, 167-187.
A key source by one of the most prominent critics of Fodor’s views on modularity.

Fodor, J. A. (1983). The Modularity of Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
A classic text by the key defender of the modularity hypothesis.

Robbins, P. (2009). Modularity of Mind. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2009 Edition). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/modularity-mind
An excellent overview of key issues.

General Works in Philosophy of Cognitive Science

I'm under contract to prepare the Philosophy of Cognitive Science entry for the new project, Oxford Bibliographies Online: Philosophy. Over the next week or so I'll be posting draft chunks so interested Hammer Heads can weigh in on any egregious omissions or regrettable inclusions. Below is the first part.

INTRODUCTION
Cognitive science is an interdisciplinary study of the mind loosely united by the idea that the mind is a computer. Philosophy is one of the main contributing disciplines (along with psychology, neuroscience, linguistics, and computer science) and many of its contributions concern the conceptual foundations of the separate disciplines (e.g. psychology and artificial intelligence), explorations of the relations between the disciplines (e.g. is psychology reducible to neuroscience?), and examinations of core uniting ideas (e.g. how best can we understand the idea that the mind is a computer?). Much contemporary philosophy of cognitive science overlaps with contemporary philosophy of mind. The present work tries as much as possible to focus on work peculiar to the philosophy of cognitive science, but the reader is advised to see pertinent work discussed in other Oxford Online Bibliographies, especially *METAPHYSICS OF MIND*, *CONSCIOUSNESS*, and *INTENTIONALITY*.

GENERAL OVERVIEWS
The works presented here address philosophy of cognitive science considered as a whole. Two sorts of general overview are represented here. The first takes on, as a philosophical project, the problem of how best to view the enterprise of cognitive science (an enterprise to which philosophy may contribute). Overviews of the first sort include Bechtel (in press), Davies (2005), Dennett (2009), and von Eckardt (1993). Dennett’s is the shortest and von Eckardt’s is the lengthiest. Dennett’s is perhaps too brief to serve as a solid overview, but he is such a major player in the filed that this piece merits attention. Bechtel’s is the next in order of brevity and surpasses Dennett’s in terms of use as an overview. The second sort of general overview is more descriptive than prescriptive and takes on the project of detailing the main kinds of philosophical contributions that have been made under the heading “philosophy of cognitive science”. Overviews of the second sort include Andler (2009), Grush (2002), and Thagard (2008). Grush’s is the best of these three. Andler’s approach is a bit idiosyncratic and his treatment is longer than Grush’s. Thagard’s aim is more to supply an overview of cognitive science than the philosophy thereof. However, Thagard’s intended audience is philosophical and thus manages to serve as a useful overview to the philosophy of cognitive science.

Andler, D. (2009). Philosophy of cognitive science. In A. Brenner & J. Gayon (Eds.), French Studies In The Philosophy Of Science. Dordrecht: Springer.
A slightly idiosyncratic essay, and not as brief as other overviews listed here.

Bechtel, W. (in press). How can philosophy be a true cognitive science discipline? Topics in Cognitive Science.
Spells out an answer to the titular question by focusing on philosophical contributions to the understanding of the mind-body problem, representation, and explanation.

Davies, M. (2005). An Approach to Philosophy of Cognitive Science. In F. Jackson & M. Smith (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Analytic Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wide ranging in the topics covered and deep in their treatment. Perhaps not terribly accessible, however, to novices.

Dennett, D. (2009). The part of cognitive science that is philosophy. Topics in Cognitive Science 1, 231–236.
Very brief, focusing on the question of what philosophy can contribute to cognitive science. Worth attention primarily for being by one of the giants of the philosophy of cognitive science.

Grush, R. (2002). The Philosophy of Cognitive Science. In P. Machamer & M. Silberstein (Eds.), Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Science. Oxford: Blackwell.
The best of the overviews presented here, covering most of the main relevant topics in a concise and accessible way.

Thagard, P. (2008). Cognitive Science. In E. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/cognitive-science
An introduction, for a philosophical audience, of cognitive science, not just the philosophy thereof. But useful, nonetheless, in what it has to say toward the end about the philosophy of cognitive science.

von Eckardt, B. (1993). What is Cognitive Science? Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Book length treatment of the titular question, offering an answer that is highly focused on the notion of mental representation.


TEXTBOOKS
Being both young and interdisciplinary, there’s little consensus on how best to teach either cognitive science or the philosophy thereof. The texts featured here are either textbooks for the philosophy of cognitive science, or textbooks for cognitive science with major authorial input from philosophers. Clark (2001) is the one most explicitly aimed at treating the philosophy of cognitive science. Also distinctive of Clark’s contribution is its sympathy for both embodied cognition and connectionism (reflecting Clark’s own research interests). Stillings et al (1995) has its chapter organization based on the main contributing disciplines in cognitive science (psychology, artificial intelligence, linguistics, neuroscience, and philosophy). Kolak et al (2006), in contrast has its chapter organization based on main areas of inquiry in cognitive science (e.g. memory, language, perception). Kolak et al (2006) is written by philosophers and is weighted more towards philosophy and neuroscience than other contributing disciplines. Thagard (1996) is written by a philosopher, is perhaps more weighted toward computational approaches than the other texts presented here, and has its chapter organization based on main areas of inquiry. Thagard’s focus throughout is on the main theories of mental representation offered by cognitive scientists.

Clark, A. (2001). Mindware: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Cognitive Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Highly accessible, distinctive in part for its emphasis on embodiment and connectionism.

Kolak, D., Hirstein, W., Mandik, P., & Waskan, J. (2006). Cognitive Science: An Introduction to the Mind and Brain. New York: Routledge.
An overview with particular emphasis on philosophy and neuroscience. Its chapter organization is based on main areas of cognitive scientific inquiry (such as perception, memory, action, and language).

Stillings, N., S. Weisler, C. Chase, M. Feinstein, J. Garfield, and E. Rissland. (1995). Cognitive Science: An Introduction. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
An excellent overview of the main contributing disciplines to cognitive science (psychology, artificial intelligence, linguistics, neuroscience, and philosophy).

Thagard, P. (1996). Mind: Introduction to cognitive science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
An introduction organized around different cognitive scientific approaches to mental representation.

REFERENCE WORKS
Both Bechtel and Graham (1998) and Wilson and Keil (1999) are excellent and wide-ranging encyclopedic works, containing many articles by leading figures. Bechtel and graham (1998) is especially noteworthy for the comprehensive introductory essay by Bechtel, Abrahamsen, and Graham, “The Life of Cognitive Science.” Chalmers and Bourget (2009) is a frequently updated online bibliography on the philosophy of cognitive science. Many of the entries contain abstracts and links to the full text of articles.

Bechtel, W., & Graham, G. (Eds.) (1998). A companion to cognitive science. Oxford: Blackwell.
An excellent encyclopedic resource, especially noteworthy for the comprehensive introductory essay “The Life of Cognitive Science.”

Chalmers, D. and Bourget, D. (2009). “PhilPapers: Philosophy of Cognitive Science”. http://philpapers.org/browse/philosophy-of-cognitive-science.
A frequently updated online bibliography, many entries of which contain abstracts and links to full text of articles.

Wilson, R. A., & Keil, F. C. (Eds.). (1999). The MIT encyclopedia of the cognitive sciences. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
An excellent encyclopedic resource.



ANTHOLOGIES
All of the anthologies contain useful material on the philosophy of cognitive science, but the ones most explicitly focused on the philosophy of cognitive science (as opposed to cognitive science in general) are Goldman (1993), Stainton (2006), and Thagard (2007). The reader looking for a portable volume should be warned about the very large size of Cummins and Cummins (2000) and Goldman (1993), though both contain an excellent collection of classic articles by key figures. Thagard (2007) is similar in quality but is both more up to date and more portable. The most portable of the anthologies listed here are Stainton (2006) and Thagard (1998). Stainton (2006) and Thagard (2007) are the most up to date.

Cummins, D. D., & Cummins, R. (Eds.). (2000). Minds, Brains, and Computers: An Historical Introduction to the Foundations of Cognitive Science. Oxford: Blackwell.
Excellent, though very large, collection of classic articles by key figures.

Goldman, A. I. (1993). Readings in philosophy and cognitive science. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Excellent, though extremely large, collection of classic articles by key figures.

Stainton, R. (2006). Contemporary debates in cognitive science. Oxford: Blackwell.
A collection of commissioned pairs of papers representing opposing sides of key issues. An excellent volume in an excellent series.

Thagard, P. (Ed.). (1998). Mind readings: Introductory selections on cognitive science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books.
An accessible and portable anthology aiming at coverage of cognitive science in general (as opposed to only the philosophy of cognitive science).

Thagard, P. (Ed.). (2007). Philosophy of psychology and cognitive science. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
An excellent and highly up to date collection.

Philosophy of Cognitive Science

I'm under contract to prepare the Philosophy of Cognitive Science entry for the new project, Oxford Bibliographies Online: Philosophy. Over the next week or so I'll be posting draft chunks so interested Hammer Heads can weigh in on any egregious omissions or regrettable inclusions. For starters, I present for your perusal the working basic category structure.

Introduction

General overviews

Textbooks/reference works

Anthologies

Cognitive architecture

Classicism and language of thought

Connectionism

Modularity

Ontological status of cognitive scientific and folk-psychological posits

Eliminativism

Reductionism

Functionalism

Philosophy of neuroscience

Theory of content

Mental imagery

Innateness

Simulation theory v. theory theory

Critiques and challenges

Consciousness

Embodiment

Antirepresentationalism and dynamic systems

AI skepticism