Introduction
General overviews
Textbooks/reference works
Anthologies
Cognitive architecture
Classicism and language of thought
Connectionism
Modularity
Ontological status of cognitive scientific and folk-psychological posits
Eliminativism
Reductionism
Functionalism
Philosophy of neuroscience
Theory of content
Mental imagery
Innateness
Simulation theory v. theory theory
Critiques and challenges
Consciousness
Embodiment
Antirepresentationalism and dynamic systems
AI skepticism
A few thoughts.
ReplyDelete(i) It seems very odd to have philosophy of neuroscience but not philosophy of linguistics, AI, psychology (I'd add them).
(ii) It's likewise odd to have mental imagery but not other topics such as perception, memory, language, emotion (I'd probably drop them all for your purposes). Especially when the heyday of the imagery debate was decades ago now.
(iii) The boundaries of philosophy of cognitive science are tricky, but I'd have thought that core theory of content is really more part of the philosophy of mind. For this entry I'd be tempted to instead have a section on representation in cognitive science.
(iv) For a nicer structure withot the stray categories, how about combining "critiques and challenges" (perhaps minus AI skepticism and antirepresentationalism, if you followed the suggestions above) with a few of the preceding entries (innateness, theory of mind) under "Special topics". It's not as if consciousness, embodiment, dynamic systems are only relevant to cognitive science as critiques/challenges in any case.
Those are quite helpful suggestions, Dave. I'll think on 'em. Mucho gracias!
ReplyDeleteP.S. Any news on the phil of cog sci reader idea you were think out loud about on your blog a while back?