From Key Terms in Philosophy of Mind (Continuum, 2010):
extended mind, the hypothesis that mental states themselves, as opposed to the factors determining their CONTENT, extend beyond the physical boundaries of an organism to include environmental phenomena. The extended-mind hypothesis may thus be characterized as a kind of vehicle EXTERNALISM and contrasted against content externalism (see VEHICLE; CONTENT/VEHICLE DISTINCTION). A key argument for the extended-mind hypothesis advanced by Andy Clark and David CHALMERS involves a THOUGHT EXPERIMENT concerning two characters, Inga and Otto (their names are evocative of “inner” and “outer”), who both make their way to a museum they’ve been to previously. Otto’s “memory” of where the museum is located is not encoded in his nervous system (he’s imagined to be an Alzheimer’s patient with difficulty doing such a thing) but is instead written down in his notebook. Inga, however, has no external record of the location of the museum but remembers the location in the usual way of what we would consider her MEMORY, perhaps by accessing INFORMATION stored in her nervous system. Clark and Chalmers urge the conclusion that the distributed system that includes Otto’s brain and notebook counts as no less a SUPERVENIENCE base for a (vehicle of) BELIEF than does Inga’s purely (or, at least, more) internal system.
It's hard for me to imagine how Chalmers would reconcile this view with his anti-physicalism. I searched the original paper and found no mention of physicalism or dualism.
ReplyDeleteThe extended mind view (I'm not sure I want to call it a "hypothesis," because that would make it sound scientifically testable) shares some features with Rylean behaviorism, according to which a mental state isn't a particular state in the brain--or a particular state anywhere, really--but a matter of intelligent behavioral dispositions and capacities. If those behaviors intrinsically require tools, like maps or diagrams, then those tools could be considered just as much a part of the "mental" as the brain itself.
A glance at Clark's description of his "Supersizing the Mind" suggests the parallel to Ryle again: viewing notes on paper, not as a record of one's work, but as the work itself. Ryle agrees. Verbal and written works are not the reports of inner thoughts (unless the work happens to be about other thoughts which were, for extrinsic reasons, kept private), but are themselves thoughts. Again, an extended mind view which traces directly to Ryle.
Thanks for the thoughts, Jason. I'm largely in agreement, with some minor modifications. I think the mind/body metaphysic behind Clark/Chalmers externalism is not so much behaviorism as it's functionalism (though, arguably, the differences are minor and Ryle may have been a functionalist anyway).
ReplyDeleteAs for compatibility with Chalmers's anti-physicalism, I think the key (not that I'm a fan of this) is that the anti-physicalism hinges on qualia and the externalism is restricted to non-qualia aspects of mentality.
Lastly, for reasons similar to your own, I'm not super thrilled calling the view a hypothesis.
I thought of that after I posted: that Chalmers might distinguish between two kinds of mental phenomena, the physical and the phenomenal.
ReplyDeleteAs for the first point, the reason I'd call it Rylean (aka "logical" or "analytic") behaviorism is that it does not limit our discussion of the mental by postulating functional states. Not that we can't or shouldn't postulate functional states; only that we don't need to in order to understand the notion of the mental. Though I confess I'm not so clear on all the varieties of functionalism, so maybe there is one that is close enough to Rylean behaviorism so as not to make a difference.