Reports from the NYU Mind and Language Seminar

Over at Philosophy Sucks!, Richard Brown is posting reports on this semester's NYU Mind and Language Seminar (run this time 'round by Jesse Prinz and Ned Block). The first report is up: "Attention and Mental Paint".

Content, Imagery, Innateness, and Theory of Mind

Here are some more mini-bibliographies for the philosophy of cognitive science. Can you dig it?

THEORY OF CONTENT
Cummins (1989) is a short book that offers a terrific and concise overview of the main issues in this area. For another concise overview, see also Pitt (2008). Stich & Warfield (1994) collects articles by key figures discussing key positions. Perhaps the most widely held positions are varieties of causal and teleological theories of content. For up to date reviews, see Neander (2009) for teleological theories and Rupert (2008) for causal theories. For interesting critical appraisals of representation and theory of content see Cummins (1996) and Ramsey (2008). See also, Clapin (2002), which is organized around a series of exchanges between key figures.

Clapin, H. (2002). Philosophy and Mental Representation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Organized around a series of exchanges between key figures such as Dennett, Clark, Cummins, Haugeland, and Cantwell-Smith.

Cummins, R. (1989). Meaning and Mental Representation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
This short book supplies an excellent and accessible overview of key issues.

Cummins, R. (1996). Representations, Targets, and Attitudes. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
A highly informative critical appraisal of main theories of content and defense of Cummins own favored view.

Neander, K. (2009). Teleological Theories of Mental Content. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2009 Edition). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2009/entries/content-teleological/
An excellent and up to date overview of what is probably the most widely held of the theories of content.

Pitt, D. (2008). Mental Representation. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/mental-representation/
An excellent article-length overview of key issues.

Ramsey, W. (2007). Representation Reconsidered. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Critical examination of the mental representation, content, and related notions.

Rupert, R. D. (2008). Causal Theories of Mental Content. Philosophy Compass, 3(2), 353-380.
Excellent and up to date review of the varieties of causal theory of content.

Stich, S. P., & Warfield, T. A. (Eds.). (1994). Mental Representation: A Reader. Oxford: Blackwell.
Useful anthology representing key positions and key figures.

MENTAL IMAGERY
Thomas (2009) is a terrific article-length overview that also includes an annotated bibliography. One of the central debates about imagery of interest in the philosophy of cognitive science is the debate between pictorial views of imagery and description views. For an anthology covering this debate, see Block (1981). For representative defenses of the descriptive view, see Fodor (1975) and Pylyshyn (1981). For representative defenses of the pictorial view, see Kosslyn (1994), Rollins (1989), and Tye (1991).

Block, N. (Ed.). (1981). Imagery. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
An anthology covering the descriptive/pictorial debate.

Fodor, J. A. (1975). The Language of Thought. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Contains a classic defense of descriptivism.

Kosslyn, S.M. (1994). Image and Brain: The Resolution of the Imagery Debate. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
A very thorough presentation of scientific consideration in favor of the pictorial view.

Pylyshyn, Z.W. (1981). The Imagery Debate: Analogue Media Versus Tacit Knowledge. Psychological Review(88) 16-45.
A work by one of the key defenders of the descriptive view.

Rollins, M. (1989). Mental Imagery: On the Limits of Cognitive Science. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
A philosophical defense of a pictorial view.

Thomas, N. J. T. (2009). Mental Imagery. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2009 Edition). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2009/entries/mental-imagery/
A terrific and up to date overview of key issues. Also includes an excellent annotated bibliography. Highly recommended.

Tye, M. (1991). The Imagery Debate. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
A philosophical defense of a pictorial view.


INNATENESS
For an excellent and concise reviews, see Cowie (2008) and Griffiths (2009). Much contemporary cognitive scientific interest in innateness and nativism focuses on language, see especially, Cowie (2008). Contemporary concerns with innateness are continuous with a long historical tradition of debate over innateness. For an excellent review of the relevant history, see Samet (2008). For critiques of nativism, see Cowie (1998) and Prinz (2002). For a defense of nativism, see Fodor (1998). Bourget and Chalmers (2009) is a frequently updated online bibliography on nativism in cognitive science. Many of the entries contain abstracts and links to the full text of articles.


Bourget, D. and Chalmers, D. (2009). “PhilPapers: Nativism in Cognitive Science”. http://philpapers.org/browse/nativism-in-cognitive-science.
A frequently updated online bibliography, many entries of which contain abstracts and links to full text of articles.

Cowie, F. (1998). What's Within? Nativism Reconsidered. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
A critique of nativism.

Cowie, F. (2008). Innateness and Language. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2008 Edition). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2008/entries/innateness-language/
An excellent and up to date overview.

Fodor, J.A. (1998). Concepts: Where Cognitive Science went Wrong, New York: Oxford University Press.
A defense of nativism by one of its key defenders in the contemporary philosophy of cognitive science.

Griffiths, P. (2009). The Distinction Between Innate and Acquired Characteristics. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2009 Edition). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/innate-acquired/
An excellent and up to date overview.

Prinz, J.J. (2002). Furnishing the Mind: Concepts and their Perceptual Basis, Bradford Books/MIT Press.
A defense of empiricism.

Samet, J. (2008). The Historical Controversies Surrounding Innateness. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/innateness-history/
An excellent review of the historical philosophical significance of innateness.

SIMULATION V. THEORY THEORY
Two excellent reviews may be relied on to cover the opposing sides of this debate. Gordon (2009) presents the simulation side and is authored by one of the key proponents of that view. Ravenscroft (2008) presents the “theory” theory. Bourget and Chalmers (2009) is a frequently updated online bibliography on the theory of mind and folk psychology. Many of the entries contain abstracts and links to the full text of articles.

Bourget, D. and Chalmers, D. (2009). “PhilPapers: Theory of Mind and Folk Psychology”. http://philpapers.org/browse/theory-of-mind-and-folk-psychology.
A frequently updated online bibliography, many entries of which contain abstracts and links to full text of articles.

Gordon, R. M. (2009). Folk Psychology as Mental Simulation. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2009 Edition). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/folkpsych-simulation/
An overview of the case for holding that folk-psychological understanding is achieved via the simulation of the mental states of others.

Ravenscroft, I. (2008). Folk Psychology as a Theory. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/folkpsych-theory/
Concise overview of the considerations in favor of regarding folk psychological understanding as embodied as a theory.

Rey's Sensational Sentences

I know that rhetorical questions are no substitute for arguments, but sometimes I just really love me some rhetorical questions. There are two especially sweet and lovable ones down there at the end.

Excerpt from Rey, G. (1993). Sensational sentences. In M. Davies & G. W. Humphreys (Eds.) Consciousness, (pp. 240-257). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

[B]y assimilating [qualitative] experience to [propositional] attitudes, we explain the essential unity of the mind, what it is that makes beliefs, desires, memories, hopes, fears and sensations all states of the same sort of entity. What are sometimes proposed as rival accounts seem to me to lack this unity. For example, biologistic or dualistic accounts that regard qualia as biological or as entirely non-physical properties of a computationally organized brain have trouble explaining how a mind that thinks by computing manages to feel by being in some further non-computational relation to such further properties. The further properties seem gratuitous and accidental: unless they were somehow represented in that life, how could they be any more a part of a person’s mental life than the colour of their brain? But then why should not the representations be enough, whether or not there are the corresponding properties? (p. 248)

Mini-bibliography of philosophy of neuroscience

I hereby continue serving up steamy draft chunks of my Oxford Bibliography on Philosophy of Cognitive Science. Now, with more brain flavor:

PHILOSOPHY OF NEUROSCIENCE
Though there’s considerable overlap with work in ELIMINATIVISM and REDUCTIONISM , in the past two decades philosophy of neuroscience has taken off as a subdiscipline of its own. Probably the most comprehensive of the article-length overviews is Bickle, Mandik, and Landreth (2006), but see also Brook and Mandik (2007). Anthologies of key works in philosophy of neuroscience are Bechtel et al (2001), Bickle (2009), Brook and Akins (2005), and Machamer, Grush, and McLaughlin (2001). Two excellent research monographs by philosophers of neuroscience are Bechtel (2008) and Bickle (2003).

Bechtel, W., Mandik, P., Mundale, J., & Stufflebeam, R. (Eds.). (2001). Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
A collection of both classic and newer works in the field.

Bechtel, W. (2008). Mental Mechanisms: Philosophical Perspectives on Cognitive Neuroscience. London: Routledge.
A research monograph presenting Bechtel’s distinctive take on the philosophy of neuroscience.

Bickle, J., Mandik, P., & Landreth, A. (2006). The Philosophy of Neuroscience [Electronic Version]. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2006 Edition), from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2006/entries/neuroscience/
The most comprehensive of the article-length treatments of the philosophy of neuroscience.

Bickle, J. (Ed.). (2009). The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
A wide ranging and up to date collection of articles by main key contributors to the area.

Bickle, J. (2003). Philosophy and Neuroscience: A ruthlessly reductive account. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic.
A research monograph presenting Bickle’s distinctive take on the philosophy of neuroscience.

Brook, A., & Mandik, P. (2007). The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Analyse & Kritik, 29(1), 3-23.
An overview of the philosophy of neuroscience that pays particular attention to issues concerning consciousness.

Brook, A., & Akins, K. (Eds.). (2005). Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
A collection of articles based on talks given at a conference dedicated to the topic.


Machamer, P., Grush, R., & McLaughlin, P. (Eds.). (2001). Theory and Method In The Neurosciences. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Of the philosophy of neuroscience anthologies, this one has perhaps the strongest leaning toward the philosophy of science (as opposed to the philosophy of mind).

ONTOLOGICAL STATUS OF COGNITIVE SCIENTIFIC AND FOLK-PSYCHOLOGICAL POSITS

Big "thank you"s are hereby transmitted to all of you who've already commented on the draft chunks I've been posting of my Oxford Bibliography on Philosophy of Cognitive Science. Here's the philcogsci version of the mind-body problem for your perusal:

ONTOLOGICAL STATUS OF COGNITIVE SCIENTIFIC AND FOLK-PSYCHOLOGICAL POSITS
The main positions discussed concerning the ontological status of the cognitive-scientific and folk-psychological posits among philosophers of cognitive science are functionalism, reductionism, and eliminativism (also known as eliminative materialism). (And functionalism is perhaps the most widely held position in the philosophy of cognitive science.) This general area is perhaps where the greatest overlap exists between the philosophy of cognitive science and the philosophy of mind, and the reader would do well to consult the Oxford Online Bibliography, *METAPHYSICS OF MIND*. For an article-length overview, see Lycan (2003). For an excellent, though avowedly contentious, book-length overview, see Rey (1997). For definitions of key relevant terminology in this area, see Mandik (2010).

Lycan, W. (2003). The Mind-Body Problem. In S. P. Stich & T. A. Warfield (Eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind (pp. 47-64). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
A brief overview of key ontological positions relevant to the philosophy of cognitive science.

Mandik, P. (2010). Key Terms in Philosophy of Mind. London: Continuum.
Dictionary containing many items of terminology of pertinence to key ontological positions in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of cognitive science.

Rey, G. (1997). Contemporary Philosophy of Mind: A Contentiously Classical Approach. Oxford: Blackwell.
Despite its avowedly contentious and classicist approach, an book-length treatment of key issues of relevance to the ontology of cognitive science and folk psychology.

ELIMINATIVISM
Though not the source of eliminativism (eliminative materialism), Churchland (1981) is one of the most discussed advocates of the position. Ramsey (2008) offers an excellent overview of the position, and key arguments for and against.

Churchland, P. M. (1981). Eliminative materialism and the propositional attitudes. Journal of Philosophy, 78, 67-90.
A classic. One of the most discussed sources of advocacy of eliminative materialism.

Ramsey, W. (2008). Eliminative Materialism. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/materialism-eliminative/
Excellent overview of key arguments both for and against.


REDUCTIONISM
One of classic defenders of reductionism (also known as the identity theory and the type-identity theory) is Smart, and his up to date (2008) offers an excellent overview. Polger (2009) is an excellent review of identity theories. Though a bit dated, Churchland (1986) is still a worthwhile sketch of empirical considerations in favor of a reductionist approach.

Churchland, P. M. (1986). Some reductive strategies in cognitive neurobiology. Mind, 95, 279-309.
A dated but worthwhile sketch of empirical considerations in favor of reductionism.

Polger, T. W. (2009). Identity Theories. Philosophy Compass, 4(5), 822-834. DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00227.x
An excellent review of key theories.

Smart, J. J. C. (2008). The Identity Theory of Mind. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/mind-identity/
An excellent overview by one of the key historical defenders of the position.

FUNCTIONALISM
One of the core features of discussion of functionalism is the closely related idea of multiple realizability. Levin (2009) is an excellent overview of the varieties of functionalism. Bickle (2008) and Funkhouser (2007) are both excellent in discussion of multiple realizability. For key historical sources of functionalism and multiple realizability considerations, see Fodor (1974), Putnam (1960), and Putnam (1967). For highly discussed sources of critique of functionalism, see Block (1980) and Block and Fodor (1972).

Bickle, J. (2008). Multiple Realizability. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/multiple-realizability/
An excellent overview of arguments concerning multiple realizability.

Block, N. (1980). “Troubles With Functionalism”, in Block, Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, Volumes 1 and 2. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 268–305.
A classic line of criticism of the adequacy of functionalist approaches.

Block, N., & Fodor, J. A. (1972). What psychological states are not. Philosophical Review, 81, 159-181.
An early classic source of criticism of functionalism.

Fodor, J. A. (1974). Special sciences, or the disunity of science as a working hypothhesis. Synthese, 28, 97-115.
An influential argument spelling out the autonomy of special sciences due to multiple realizability considerations.

Funkhouser, E. (2007). Multiple Realizability. Philosophy Compass 2(2), 303–315.
An excellent overview of key issues.

Levin, J. (2009). Functionalism. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2009 Edition). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2009/entries/functionalism/
An excellent discussion of the many varieties of functionalism pertinent to the philosophy of cognitive science.

Putnam, H. (1960). Minds and machines. In S. Hook (Ed.), Dimensions of Mind: New York University Press.
One of the key early sources of functionalism.

Putnam, H. (1967). The nature of mental states. In Capitan & Merrill (Eds.), Art, Mind, and Religion: Pittsburgh University Press.
One of the key early sources of functionalism.

CO2 Program Finalized

Richard Brown sez: CO2 Program Finalized: "

I am pleased to announce that the program for the Second Online Consciousness Conference has been finalized. It is available here: http://consciousnessonline.wordpress.com (and reproduced below). I hope you will join us February 19th-March 5th for what promises to be a very exciting conference. Please post and distribute widely; apologies for cross posting.

Special Session on Higher Order Consciousness

• Hakwan Lau, Columbia University

Sensory Awareness and Perceptual Certainty
Commentators:
• Ned Block, New York University
• David Rosenthal, The Graduate Center, CUNY
• David Chalmers, Australian National University/New York university

Invited Colloquium on the State of the Art in Brain Decoding

• Colin Clifford, University of Sydney

• TBA

• John-Dylan Haynes, Bernstein Center for Computational Neuroscience -Berlin

• TBA

Contributed Sessions

• Matthew Conduct, Durham University, UK

Naive Realism Without Disjunctivism about Experience
Commentators:
• Michelle Montague, University of Bristol
• Susanna Siegel, Harvard University

• Keith Frankish, The Open University, UK

Qualia: The Real Thing?
Commentators:
• Richard Brown, LaGuardia Community College, CUNY
• Amy Kind, Claremont McKenna College

• Philip Goff, University of Hertfordshire, UK

Ghosts and Sparse Properties
Commentators:
• Andrew Melnyk, University of Missouri
• Esa Diaz-Leon, Manitoba University, Canada

• Dan Lloyd, Trinity College

Neural Correlates of Temporality: Default Mode Variability and State-Dependent Temporal Awareness
Commentators:
• Geoffrey Lee, University of California, Berkeley

• Pete Mandik, William Patterson University

• Color Consciousness Conceptualism
• Commentators:
• Philippe Chuard, Southern Methodist University
Jacob Berger & David Pereplyotchik, The Graduate Center, CUNY
• Charlie Pelling, Birkbeck College, University of London

• Joseph Neisser, Grinnell College

Inner Psychophysics: Correlates, Causes, and the Neurobiology of Consciousness
Commentators:
• Jakob Hohwy, Monash University, Australia

• Adam Pautz, University of Texas, Austin

Why Consciousness Can’t Just be in the Head: A New Argument against Biological Theories
Commentators:
• Sydney Shoemaker, Cornell University
• Thomas Polger & Doug Keaton, University of Cincinnati

• Stephane Savanah, Macquarie University, Australia

The Concept Possession Hypothesis of Self-Consciousness
Commentators:
• James Dow, The Graduate Center, CUNY
Kristina Musholt, Berlin School of Mind and Brain

• Carolyn Suchy-Dicey, Boston University

Inductive Skepticism and the Methodological Argument
Commentators:
Jennifer Corns, The Graduate Center, CUNY
• John Campbell, University of California, Berkeley

• Brian Talbot, University of Colorado, Bolder

The irrelevance of Folk Intuitions to the ‘Hard Problem’ of Consciousness
Commentators:
• Justin Sytsma & Edouard Machery, University of Pittsburg
• Bryce Huebner, Georgetown University

"

Philosophy of Cognitive Architecture

I'm under contract to prepare the Philosophy of Cognitive Scienceentry for the new project, Oxford Bibliographies Online: Philosophy. Over the next week or so I'll be posting draft chunks so interested Hammer Heads can weigh in on any egregious omissions or regrettable inclusions. Below are the readings on cognitive architecture.

COGNITIVE ARCHITECTURE
Central issues concerning cognitive architecture concern the question of modularity (are distinct functions implemented in distinct modules) and the conflict between connectionists and those who favor the language of thought hypothesis (LOT). Davies (1989) touches on all three of these central issues. Aizawa (2002) discusses cognitive architecture primarily through examination of arguments for the classicist or language-of-thought-based approach. Eliasmith (2003) is primarily aimed an promoting his “Representation and Dynamics” theory, but manages along the way to provide an overview of key issues concerning the connectionism v. LOT debate. Eliasmith (2003) contains no explicit discussion of modularity.

Aizawa, K. (2002). Cognitive architecture. In S. Stich & T. Warfield (Eds.), Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Blackwell.
Accessible evaluation of key arguments in favor of the classicist language-of-thought approach to cognitive architecture.

Martin Davies (1989). Connectionism, Modularity and Tacit Knowledge. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (December):541-55.
An interesting discussion touching on the main philosophical issues of cognitive architecture: language of thought, connectionism, and modularity.

Eliasmith, C. (2003). Moving beyond metaphors: Understanding the mind for what it is. Journal of Philosophy, 100, 493-520.
A presentation of Eliasmith’s Representation and Dynamics theory that also manages to serve as an overview of connectionist and language-of-thought approaches to cognitive architecture.


CLASSICISM AND LANGUAGE OF THOUGHT
At the core of classicism (also known as symbolicism) is the language of thought hypothesis (LOT). Aydede (2008) is a top-notch discussion of LOT, and includes a section on the connectionism/classicism debate. Fodor is an iconic defender of LOT, and Fodor (1975) is a classic treatment. Fodor (2008) is the sequel.

Aydede, M. (2008). The Language of Thought Hypothesis. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/language-thought
An excellent discussion of the key issues, including the connectionism/classicism debate.

Fodor, J. A. (1975). The Language of Thought. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
The key defense by the most famous defender of the language of thought hypothesis. A classic.

Fodor, J. (2008). LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited Oxford: Oxford University Press.
The sequel to Fodor (1975).


CONNECTIONISM
The best of the bunch here, as far as covering key issues is concerned, are Bechtel and Abrahmsen (2002) and Garson (2008). Ramsey, Stich, and Rumelhart (1991) is an influential anthology. For more partisan treatments, Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988) is a classic source of skepticism about connectionism, and Churchland (1995) and Clark (1989) are sympathetic defenders of connectionist approaches. Chalmers and Bourget (2009) is a frequently updated online bibliography on connectionism. Many of the entries contain abstracts and links to the full text of articles.


Bechtel, W., & Abrahamsen, A. (2002). Connectionism and the mind: Parallel processing, dynamics, and evolution in networks (2 ed.). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
An excellent book-length overview of key issues.

Chalmers, D. and Bourget, D. (2009). “PhilPapers: Philosophy of Connectionism”. http://philpapers.org/browse/philosophy-of-connectionism.
A frequently updated online bibliography, many entries of which contain abstracts and links to full text of articles.

Churchland, P. M. (1995). The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
A presentation of a view of key issues about the mind and brain from a heavily connectionist-centric and neuro-centric point of view.

Clark, A. (1989). Microcognition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
An excellent monograph from a pro-connectionist.

Fodor, J. A., & Pylyshyn, Z. W. (1988). Connectionism and cognitive architecture. Cognition, 28, 3-71.
A classic source for skepticism about the merits of connectionism.

Garson, J. (2008). Connectionism. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2008 Edition). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2008/entries/connectionism
An excellent article-length overview of key issues.

Ramsey, W., Stich, S. P., & Rumelhart, D. M. (1991). Philosophy and Connectionist Theory. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
An influential anthology collecting articles by key figures.

MODULARITY
Robbins (2009) is an excellent overview of key issues. Much philosophical discussion of modularity concerns claims made by Fodor on behalf of modularity. Fodor (1983) is a classic source. Churchland (1988) is a classic critique. Chalmers and Bourget (2009) is a frequently updated online bibliography on modularity in cognitive science. Many of the entries contain abstracts and links to the full text of articles.

Chalmers, D. and Bourget, D. (2009). “PhilPapers: Modularity in Cognitive Science”. http://philpapers.org/browse/modularity-in-cognitive-science.
A frequently updated online bibliography, many entries of which contain abstracts and links to full text of articles.

Churchland, P. M. (1988). Perceptual plasticity and theoretical neutrality: A reply to Jerry Fodor. Philosophy of Science, 55, 167-187.
A key source by one of the most prominent critics of Fodor’s views on modularity.

Fodor, J. A. (1983). The Modularity of Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
A classic text by the key defender of the modularity hypothesis.

Robbins, P. (2009). Modularity of Mind. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2009 Edition). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/modularity-mind
An excellent overview of key issues.

General Works in Philosophy of Cognitive Science

I'm under contract to prepare the Philosophy of Cognitive Science entry for the new project, Oxford Bibliographies Online: Philosophy. Over the next week or so I'll be posting draft chunks so interested Hammer Heads can weigh in on any egregious omissions or regrettable inclusions. Below is the first part.

INTRODUCTION
Cognitive science is an interdisciplinary study of the mind loosely united by the idea that the mind is a computer. Philosophy is one of the main contributing disciplines (along with psychology, neuroscience, linguistics, and computer science) and many of its contributions concern the conceptual foundations of the separate disciplines (e.g. psychology and artificial intelligence), explorations of the relations between the disciplines (e.g. is psychology reducible to neuroscience?), and examinations of core uniting ideas (e.g. how best can we understand the idea that the mind is a computer?). Much contemporary philosophy of cognitive science overlaps with contemporary philosophy of mind. The present work tries as much as possible to focus on work peculiar to the philosophy of cognitive science, but the reader is advised to see pertinent work discussed in other Oxford Online Bibliographies, especially *METAPHYSICS OF MIND*, *CONSCIOUSNESS*, and *INTENTIONALITY*.

GENERAL OVERVIEWS
The works presented here address philosophy of cognitive science considered as a whole. Two sorts of general overview are represented here. The first takes on, as a philosophical project, the problem of how best to view the enterprise of cognitive science (an enterprise to which philosophy may contribute). Overviews of the first sort include Bechtel (in press), Davies (2005), Dennett (2009), and von Eckardt (1993). Dennett’s is the shortest and von Eckardt’s is the lengthiest. Dennett’s is perhaps too brief to serve as a solid overview, but he is such a major player in the filed that this piece merits attention. Bechtel’s is the next in order of brevity and surpasses Dennett’s in terms of use as an overview. The second sort of general overview is more descriptive than prescriptive and takes on the project of detailing the main kinds of philosophical contributions that have been made under the heading “philosophy of cognitive science”. Overviews of the second sort include Andler (2009), Grush (2002), and Thagard (2008). Grush’s is the best of these three. Andler’s approach is a bit idiosyncratic and his treatment is longer than Grush’s. Thagard’s aim is more to supply an overview of cognitive science than the philosophy thereof. However, Thagard’s intended audience is philosophical and thus manages to serve as a useful overview to the philosophy of cognitive science.

Andler, D. (2009). Philosophy of cognitive science. In A. Brenner & J. Gayon (Eds.), French Studies In The Philosophy Of Science. Dordrecht: Springer.
A slightly idiosyncratic essay, and not as brief as other overviews listed here.

Bechtel, W. (in press). How can philosophy be a true cognitive science discipline? Topics in Cognitive Science.
Spells out an answer to the titular question by focusing on philosophical contributions to the understanding of the mind-body problem, representation, and explanation.

Davies, M. (2005). An Approach to Philosophy of Cognitive Science. In F. Jackson & M. Smith (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Analytic Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wide ranging in the topics covered and deep in their treatment. Perhaps not terribly accessible, however, to novices.

Dennett, D. (2009). The part of cognitive science that is philosophy. Topics in Cognitive Science 1, 231–236.
Very brief, focusing on the question of what philosophy can contribute to cognitive science. Worth attention primarily for being by one of the giants of the philosophy of cognitive science.

Grush, R. (2002). The Philosophy of Cognitive Science. In P. Machamer & M. Silberstein (Eds.), Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Science. Oxford: Blackwell.
The best of the overviews presented here, covering most of the main relevant topics in a concise and accessible way.

Thagard, P. (2008). Cognitive Science. In E. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/cognitive-science
An introduction, for a philosophical audience, of cognitive science, not just the philosophy thereof. But useful, nonetheless, in what it has to say toward the end about the philosophy of cognitive science.

von Eckardt, B. (1993). What is Cognitive Science? Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Book length treatment of the titular question, offering an answer that is highly focused on the notion of mental representation.


TEXTBOOKS
Being both young and interdisciplinary, there’s little consensus on how best to teach either cognitive science or the philosophy thereof. The texts featured here are either textbooks for the philosophy of cognitive science, or textbooks for cognitive science with major authorial input from philosophers. Clark (2001) is the one most explicitly aimed at treating the philosophy of cognitive science. Also distinctive of Clark’s contribution is its sympathy for both embodied cognition and connectionism (reflecting Clark’s own research interests). Stillings et al (1995) has its chapter organization based on the main contributing disciplines in cognitive science (psychology, artificial intelligence, linguistics, neuroscience, and philosophy). Kolak et al (2006), in contrast has its chapter organization based on main areas of inquiry in cognitive science (e.g. memory, language, perception). Kolak et al (2006) is written by philosophers and is weighted more towards philosophy and neuroscience than other contributing disciplines. Thagard (1996) is written by a philosopher, is perhaps more weighted toward computational approaches than the other texts presented here, and has its chapter organization based on main areas of inquiry. Thagard’s focus throughout is on the main theories of mental representation offered by cognitive scientists.

Clark, A. (2001). Mindware: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Cognitive Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Highly accessible, distinctive in part for its emphasis on embodiment and connectionism.

Kolak, D., Hirstein, W., Mandik, P., & Waskan, J. (2006). Cognitive Science: An Introduction to the Mind and Brain. New York: Routledge.
An overview with particular emphasis on philosophy and neuroscience. Its chapter organization is based on main areas of cognitive scientific inquiry (such as perception, memory, action, and language).

Stillings, N., S. Weisler, C. Chase, M. Feinstein, J. Garfield, and E. Rissland. (1995). Cognitive Science: An Introduction. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
An excellent overview of the main contributing disciplines to cognitive science (psychology, artificial intelligence, linguistics, neuroscience, and philosophy).

Thagard, P. (1996). Mind: Introduction to cognitive science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
An introduction organized around different cognitive scientific approaches to mental representation.

REFERENCE WORKS
Both Bechtel and Graham (1998) and Wilson and Keil (1999) are excellent and wide-ranging encyclopedic works, containing many articles by leading figures. Bechtel and graham (1998) is especially noteworthy for the comprehensive introductory essay by Bechtel, Abrahamsen, and Graham, “The Life of Cognitive Science.” Chalmers and Bourget (2009) is a frequently updated online bibliography on the philosophy of cognitive science. Many of the entries contain abstracts and links to the full text of articles.

Bechtel, W., & Graham, G. (Eds.) (1998). A companion to cognitive science. Oxford: Blackwell.
An excellent encyclopedic resource, especially noteworthy for the comprehensive introductory essay “The Life of Cognitive Science.”

Chalmers, D. and Bourget, D. (2009). “PhilPapers: Philosophy of Cognitive Science”. http://philpapers.org/browse/philosophy-of-cognitive-science.
A frequently updated online bibliography, many entries of which contain abstracts and links to full text of articles.

Wilson, R. A., & Keil, F. C. (Eds.). (1999). The MIT encyclopedia of the cognitive sciences. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
An excellent encyclopedic resource.



ANTHOLOGIES
All of the anthologies contain useful material on the philosophy of cognitive science, but the ones most explicitly focused on the philosophy of cognitive science (as opposed to cognitive science in general) are Goldman (1993), Stainton (2006), and Thagard (2007). The reader looking for a portable volume should be warned about the very large size of Cummins and Cummins (2000) and Goldman (1993), though both contain an excellent collection of classic articles by key figures. Thagard (2007) is similar in quality but is both more up to date and more portable. The most portable of the anthologies listed here are Stainton (2006) and Thagard (1998). Stainton (2006) and Thagard (2007) are the most up to date.

Cummins, D. D., & Cummins, R. (Eds.). (2000). Minds, Brains, and Computers: An Historical Introduction to the Foundations of Cognitive Science. Oxford: Blackwell.
Excellent, though very large, collection of classic articles by key figures.

Goldman, A. I. (1993). Readings in philosophy and cognitive science. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Excellent, though extremely large, collection of classic articles by key figures.

Stainton, R. (2006). Contemporary debates in cognitive science. Oxford: Blackwell.
A collection of commissioned pairs of papers representing opposing sides of key issues. An excellent volume in an excellent series.

Thagard, P. (Ed.). (1998). Mind readings: Introductory selections on cognitive science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books.
An accessible and portable anthology aiming at coverage of cognitive science in general (as opposed to only the philosophy of cognitive science).

Thagard, P. (Ed.). (2007). Philosophy of psychology and cognitive science. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
An excellent and highly up to date collection.

Selections from the filmography of James O. Incandenza

The Gallery at the LeRoy Neiman Center for Print Studies Presents:

A FAILED ENTERTAINMENT
Selections from the filmography of James O. Incandenza
Exhibition Dates: Jan 29 - Feb 19th
Opening Reception: Friday, Jan 29th, 6-8 pm
Film Screening to take place during opening reception.

In 1996 author David Foster Wallace published his novel Infinite Jest and was instantly hailed as one of the greatest authors of the 20th century, eventually being granted a MacArthur award. His sprawling and complex novel chronicles the lives of the characters surrounding James Incandenza- avant-garde filmmaker, mathematician, and visionary tennis instructor. The plot largely revolves around the missing master copy of one of Incandenza's films, titled Infinite Jest, a film so entertaining to its viewers that they become catatonic, losing all interest in anything other than endless viewings of the film.

Included as a footnote in Wallace's novel is theComplete filmography of James O. Incandenza, a detailed list of over 70 industrial, documentary, conceptual, advertorial, technical, parodic, dramatic non-commercial, and non-dramatic commercial works. The LeRoy Neiman Gallery has commissioned artists and filmmakers to re-create seminal works from Incandenza's filmography.

Contributors:

• Trisha Baga
• Sam Ekwurtzel
• Michael Gaillard
• Gene Gort
• Van Hanos
• Brendan Harman
• Tim Hyde
• The K.I.D.S.
• Kevjn Kelley
• Zerek Kempf
• Tim Lawless
• Tracy Molis
• Davida Nemeroff
• Rory Parks
• JJ Peet
• Robert Rhee
• William Santen
• Jessica Segall
• Grzegorz Surman
• hristine Wang

More TBA

Eigengrau

From http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eigengrau

Eigengrau (German: "intrinsic gray"), also called Eigenlicht
("intrinsic light"), dark light, or brain gray, is the color seen by
the eye in perfect darkness. Even in the absence of light, some action
potentials are still sent along the optic nerve, causing the sensation
of a uniform dark gray color.

Eigengrau is perceived as lighter than a black object in normal
lighting conditions, because contrast is more important to the visual
system than absolute brightness. For example, the night sky looks
darker than eigengrau because of the contrast provided by the stars.

William G. Lycan: Is Property Dualism Better Off than Substance Dualism?

William G. Lycan: Is Property Dualism Better Off than Substance Dualism?

During the last quarter-century, mind-body dualism has been doing surprisingly well: Campbell (1984), Swinburne (1986), Madell (1988), Robinson (1988, 2004), Hart (1988), Foster (1991), Seager (1991), Strawson (1994), Chalmers (1995), Taliaferro (1996), Bealer (1997), Stubenberg (1998), Griffin (1998), Hasker (1999), Rosenberg (2004), and others. But, with the notable exceptions of Swinburne, Hart and Foster, these dualists are merely property dualists rather than Cartesian substance dualists. They hold that some of our mental states have immaterial properties, but not that we ourselves are immaterial Cartesian souls entirely distinct from our bodies. The prevalent idea is that property dualism is tenable (or even demonstrated), but we are not crazy. I reject this disparity. I think that most of the standard objections to Cartesian dualism (CD) count as effectively against property dualism (PD), and that PD is hardly more plausible, or less implausible, than CD. Granted, assuming that a Cartesian ego would eo ipso have some immaterial mental properties, you might suppose that CD is logically stronger than PD; so one would need a reason for accepting CD over and above PD, and there must be at least one objection that applies to CD but not to PD. However, as we shall see, nonCartesian property dualism (PD & ~CD) faces at least two objections that CD does not.

News about Color-Consciousness Conceptualism

My paper Color-Consciousness Conceptualism has been accepted for the Second Consciousness Online conference that Richard Brown is (doing a terrific job of) organizing. Commentaries on my paper are lined up from Philippe Chuard of Southern Methodist University and Jacob Berger & David Pereplyotchik of the CUNY Graduate Center. I hope that there's something left of my arguments after those 3 dudes are through with me! [update, 1/18/2010: Make that 4 dudes. Also commenting: Charlie Pelling, Birkbeck College, University of London]

I've got this wild ambition of making a video of a nerd droning on about philosophy and cognitive science that's actually watchable. Below is a test run. I think I still have a long way to go.

Notes on "What is it like to be a phenomenologist?"

Notes on Jolley, K. D., & Watkins, M. (1998). What is it Like to be a Phenomenologist? The Philosophical Quarterly, 48(191), 204-209.

J&W might seem to be fellow travellers in my quest to ward off Raffman’s worries about conceptualism [link to my Color-Consciousness Conceptualism], but there are two related points that bother me about their account. The first is that they find themselves denying that, in relevant cases of judgment, judgments of distinctness can be made without differences in appearance. The second concerns their illustration of the first point (illustrations involving phenomenal sorites). When we think about the illustration in the right way, we come to see that they have not properly focused on the relevant class of judgments.

Their discussion of sorieties goes something like this. A series of chips placed side by side can be produced such that adjacent chips are indistinguishable shades, but chips at the beginning and end of the series are clearly distinguishable. As J&W describe these cases one might come to judge that adjecent chips are of different shades even though there is no difference in the appearance of the chips.

I question whether such judgments are relevant for the discussion of Raffman’s criticism of conceptualism. The sorites case seems to me to be importantly similar to the following case, a case that I take to be clearly irrelevant to the evaluation of Raffman’s case.

Suppose there are two shades that I judge to be different because I’ve watched over a black & white TV one of my color-sighted friends distinghish the shades. But this seems to clearly be irrelevant to the discussion of Raffman’s arguments. Perhaps the problem here is that the concepts I exercise in the TV case aren’t observational concepts (they are, in this case, deferential).

So what judgments are relevant to the evaluation of Raffman’s arguments? They seem to be the ones in which there clearly is an apparent difference in the color samples presented. For it is in these cases it is plausible that, at least in the synchronic conditions, there are different color-correlated contents in conscious experience.

Control Conscious forthcoming in Topics in Cognitive Science

My article "Control Consciousness" has just been accepted for publication in the journal Topics in Cognitive Science. Here's a link to the draft file: [link].

Abstract: Control consciousness is the awareness or experience of seeming to be in control of one’s actions. One view, which I will be arguing against in the present paper, is that control consciousness is a form of sensory consciousness. On such a view, control consciousness is exhausted by sensory elements such as tactile and proprioceptive information. An opposing view, which I will be arguing for, is that sensory elements cannot be the whole story and must be supplemented by direct contributions of nonsensory, motor elements. More specifically, I will be arguing for the view that the neural basis of control consciousness is constituted by states of recurrent activation in relatively intermediate levels of the motor hierarchy.

Tallis's Time-travel Argument Against Physicalism

Most of the arguments that appear in Ray Tallis's "You won't find consciousness in the brain" were old news to me, but at least one of them I hadn't heard of before. In brief, it goes like this:

1. No neural/physical state can reach into the past or future.
2. Consciousness can reach into the past or future.
Therefore, you won't find consciousness in the brain.

Take that, brain lubbers!

I leave it as an exercise for readers to come up with an unequivocal reading of this stuff about reaching that can make one of the premises plausible without rendering the other one insane.

The relevant passage from the article is this:

And there is an insuperable problem with a sense of past and future. Take memory. It is typically seen as being "stored" as the effects of experience which leave enduring changes in, for example, the properties of synapses and consequently in circuitry in the nervous system. But when I "remember", I explicitly reach out of the present to something that is explicitly past. A synapse, being a physical structure, does not have anything other than its present state. It does not, as you and I do, reach temporally upstream from the effects of experience to the experience that brought about the effects. In other words, the sense of the past cannot exist in a physical system. This is consistent with the fact that the physics of time does not allow for tenses: Einstein called the distinction between past, present and future a "stubbornly persistent illusion".

h/t to @dweisk for putting this gem on my radar.

David Lewis

From the "Key Thinkers" section of Key Terms in Philosophy of Mind by Pete Mandik, to be published by Continuum in May 2010 (link to publisher's page).

Lewis, David (1941–2001) Lewis’s contributions to the philosophy of mind involved the development of various physicalistic theses and defenses of PHYSICALISM. The brand of physicalism that Lewis favored was a kind of FUNCTIONALISM whereby functional analyses where obtained by collecting the mass of commonsense platitudes about mental states—platitudes such as “People who desire something tend to seek it out,” “People who believe that something will cause painful experiences will fear it,” and so on—and then codifying such mental states in the form of theories expressed as sets of Ramsey sentences (see RAMSEY SENTENCE. See also RAMSIFICATION). Lewis saw the resultant functionalism as compatible with the TYPE-IDENTITY THESIS (see also TYPE-TYPE IDENTITY). The functional roles described by the Ramsified theory, discovered by consulting commonsense platitudes, were open to be identified with entities discoverable in the physical sciences, including neuroscience.

Lewis was an influential defender of the ability hypothesis, a physicalist response to the KNOWLEDGE ARGUMENT whereby it is objected that KNOWLEDGE of WHAT IT IS LIKE to see red is not, as presupposed by the knowledge argument, a kind of PROPOSITIONAL KNOWLEDGE, but instead, a kind of KNOW-HOW. Defenders of the ability hypothesis hold that the knowledge of what it is like to see red is constituted by an ability to recognize and imagine red things (see also IMAGERY; MEMORY).

Representative writings:

“An argument for the identity theory” (1966)

“Psychophysical and theoretical identifications” (1970)

“Mad pain and Martian pain” (1980)

“What experience teaches” (1990)

Top 10 Brain Hammer Posts of 2010

1. Are Cubes Physical?
2. The Doxastic Voluntarism Paradox
3. UltraRed and InfraPurple
4. Indeterminate Determinables in Reality, Belief, and Experience
5. Ectoplasmic Electron and the Ghost Beef
6. SEP iPhone app
7. Supervenience and Neuroscience
8. Color-Consciousness Conceptualism
9. Philosophy of Cognitive Science
10. Top 10 Brain Hammer Posts of 2010

Philosophy of Cognitive Science

I'm under contract to prepare the Philosophy of Cognitive Science entry for the new project, Oxford Bibliographies Online: Philosophy. Over the next week or so I'll be posting draft chunks so interested Hammer Heads can weigh in on any egregious omissions or regrettable inclusions. For starters, I present for your perusal the working basic category structure.

Introduction

General overviews

Textbooks/reference works

Anthologies

Cognitive architecture

Classicism and language of thought

Connectionism

Modularity

Ontological status of cognitive scientific and folk-psychological posits

Eliminativism

Reductionism

Functionalism

Philosophy of neuroscience

Theory of content

Mental imagery

Innateness

Simulation theory v. theory theory

Critiques and challenges

Consciousness

Embodiment

Antirepresentationalism and dynamic systems

AI skepticism

Sweet Cybernetic Cephalopods!

I guess this painting by John Totleben is Dr. Octopus as a real octopus or whatever (read about it here, ye geeks), but what I care about is that this is probably the most sweet-ass painting of an octopus in a power suit that I've ever laid my eyes on.

Color-Consciousness Conceptualism

Here's a draft of something I've been kicking around for a while, now: Color-Consciousness Conceptualism [link].

The central idea is to explain away allegedly damning data concerning color discrimination. The data in question concern color pairs the members of which are distinguishable in synchronous but not diachronic presentations. This might be thought to give the conceptualist about conscious contents a problem. The thought seems to be this: Since the colors are visually distinguishable, they are clear candidates for conscious contents. However, concepts, especially concepts for most of the highly-determinate shades, seem to be learned items. So there's a close connection between concepts and memory and learning. And since the colors in question are indistinguishable across a memory delay, that puts pressure on the idea that conscious contents are exclusively conceptual.

In the paper I sketch a model that can allow the conceptualist to explain away the data. The picture accompanying this post gives a flow-charty gist of the explanation. The main elements involve positing nonconscious nonconceptual inputs whose down stream effects are solely conceptual. Crucially, solely conceptual contents in conscious experience plus solely conceptual contents in a short-term memory buffer give rise to the relevant discrimination judgments (or lack thereof).

Anyway, comments welcome!

Lock Step

Lock Step
Originally uploaded by Ray Gunn

Another new Ray Gunn photo that I'm totally digging.

Gaper's Delay

Gaper's Delay
Originally uploaded by Ray Gunn

Ray Gunn took this pic when we were in Vegas together a few weeks ago celebrating my 40th birthday.

Dennett's "The Part of Cognitive Science That Is Philosophy"

Daniel C. Dennett. The Part of Cognitive Science That Is Philosophy.
Topics in Cognitive Science 1 (2009) 231–236
http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/tops_1015.pdf

Abstract: There is much good work for philosophers to do in cognitive science if they adopt the constructive attitude that prevails in science, work toward testable hypotheses, and take on the task of clarifying the relationship between the scientific concepts and the everyday concepts with which we conduct our moral lives.

Supervenience and Neuroscience

My paper "Supervenience and Neuroscience" has just today made the transition from sorta-mostly-accepted for publication in Synthese to totally-definitely-accepted for publication in Synthese. Many Brain-Hammer Heads were very helpful in suffering through earlier versions. Thanks, all y'all!

Here's a link to the latest version: [link].

Abstract: The philosophical technical term “supervenience” is frequently used in the philosophy of mind as a concise way of characterizing the core idea of physicalism in a manner that is neutral with respect to debates between reductive physicalists and nonreductive physicalists. I argue against this alleged neutrality and side with reductive physicalists. I am especially interested here in debates between psychoneural reductionists and nonreductive functionalist physicalists. Central to my arguments will be considerations concerning how best to articulate the spirit of the idea of supervenience. I argue for a version of supervenience, “fine-grained supervenience,” which is the claim that if, at a given time, a single entity instantiates two distinct mental properties, it must do so in virtue of instantiating two distinct physical properties. I argue further that despite initial appearances to the contrary, such a construal of supervenience can be embraced only by reductive physicalists.

SEP iPhone app

I am totally geekin' out over the iPhone app for the Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Here's my review: it's really good. Free,
too.

Screenshot: "Philosophy of Neuroscience" by Bickle, Mandik, & Landreth.

Ectoplasmic Electron and the Ghost Beef

The results so far of my New Year's poll concerning whether cubes are necessarily physical is that 66.7% say they aren't. And I must admit I'm a bit shocked at the numbers.

I wonder how much depends on the specific example. So let's do this again, this time without cubes. How about electrons? Or five pounds of ground beef?

1. True or False? Necessarily, for all x, if x is an electron, then x is physical.
2. True or False? Necessarily, for all x, if x is five pounds of ground beef, then x is physical.

How many Brain-Hammer Heads think there are worlds with ectoplasmic electrons? Ghost beef?

Indeterminate Determinables in Reality, Belief, and Experience

Here are three theses concerning determinates, determinables, and beliefs and experiences thereof:

1. There are instances of determinables that aren't instances of any of that determinable's determinates.
2. There are beliefs that a determinable is instantiated that aren't beliefs about any of that determinable's determinates being instantiated.
3. There are perceptual experiences of a determinable being instantiated that aren't experiences of any of that determinable's determinates being instantiated.

Remarks:

R1. If there were any examples of 1, one might be a shape that was polygonal without being any particular kind of polygon. I'm guessing 1 is widely held to be false. If anyone has advocated the truth of something like 1 in print, I'd love to hear about it.

R2. I'm guessing that 2 is widely held to be true. I believe that there's a car parked outside that's painted a color, but there's no particular color that I believe it to be painted.

R3. Of 1-3, is 3 the most controversial? I tend to go for 3, but I had a couple of conversations recently with some strongly anti-3 philosophers. If anyone knows of an argument, in print, that, for instance, something can't be seen to be green without being seen to be some determinate shade of green, I'd love to hear about it.

UltraRed and InfraPurple

Suppose we made the following modifications to a normal human perceiver while, as much as possible, keeping all else the same: We increase the sensitivity range of the relevant photoreceptors to allow for the transduction of both higher-frequencies and lower-frequencies of EM than normal, thus expanding the visible spectrum into the infrared and the ultraviolet. Which of the following is the most reasonable prediction about what it would be like to see the new colors?:

1. The hue circle for modifieds would gain one new hue located between violet and red. Further, for modifieds, red would not look as similar to violet as it does to normals. Red would look more similar to the new hue than it does to violet.
2. The hue circle for modifieds would gain two new hues, roughly corresponding to infrared and ultraviolet. Red and violet would look even more different than each other than in option (1), with two distinct hues separating them on the hue circle.
3. Something else entirely.

The Doxastic Voluntarism Paradox

The following strikes me as paradox-ish, if not outright paradoxical:

(DVP): Jennifer refuses to beleive in doxastic voluntarism.

Remarks and assumptions:

1. S can refuse to believe that P only if doxastic voluntarism is true
(seems prima facie reasonable).

2. Jennifer believes 1 (I hereby stipulate that).

Are cubes physical?

Sitting through several antireductionist talks at the Eastern APA made
me wonder about just how much divergence there is in contemporary
philosophers' intuitions about physicality. In the spirit of intuition
calibration, I am hereby surveying Brain-Hammer Heads on the following:

True or false? Necessarily, for all x, if x is cube (or approximately
cubic) then x is physical.