Monday, December 10, 2012

Canadian scientists create a functioning, virtual brain | canada.com


Chris Eliasmith has spent years contemplating how to build a brain.
He is about to publish a book with instructions, which describes the grey matter’s architecture and how the different components interact.
“Then I thought the only way people are going to believe me is if I demonstrate it,” says the University of Waterloo neuroscientist.
So Eliasmith’s team built Spaun, which was billed Thursday as “the world’s largest simulation of a functioning brain.”

Wednesday, November 21, 2012

Extraterrestrial Cognition and Sensoria Fiction

Calling all Hammerheads!
Dear Hammerheads,

For a Philosophy & SciFi class I'm piloting spring semester, I'm seeking recommendations of sci fi, preferably short, that depicts either extraterrestrial cognition or extraterrestrial phenomenology.

What's good? Whatchoogot?

Cheers,

Pete

Saturday, November 10, 2012

Strawson and Evans Videos on Truth

Oxford philosophers P F Strawson and Gareth Evans talk about Truth, in 1973.

Part 1 of 2:

Part 2 of 2:

Friday, November 2, 2012

Special issue on Embodied Social Cognition

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. Volume 11 Number 4 

In this issue:
Introduction to debates on embodied social cognition
Shannon Spaulding
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Implicit mindreading and embodied cognition
J. Robert Thompson
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On the role of social interaction in social cognition: a mechanistic alternative to enactivism
Mitchell Herschbach
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Unlikely allies: embodied social cognition and the intentional stance
Tadeusz Wieslaw Zawidzki
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Action, mindreading and embodied social cognition
Joshua Shepherd
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Embodying the False-Belief Tasks
Michael Wilby
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Dynamic Embodied Cognition
Leon C. de Bruin & Lena Kästner
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Mirror systems and simulation: a neo-empiricist interpretation
John Michael
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Reenactment: an embodied cognition approach to meaning and linguistic content
Sergeiy Sandler
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Gestural sense-making: hand gestures as intersubjective linguistic enactments
Elena Cuffari
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Friday, October 19, 2012

cfp: Fifth Online Consciousness Conference


I am pleased to announce the call for papers for the Fifth Online Consciousness Conference, which is scheduled for February 15-March 1, 2013.
Invited talk by Daniel C. Dennett, Tufts University
Special Session on Self-Consciousness organized by John Schwenkler, Mount St. Mary’s University. Invited participants include Katja Crone and Joel Smith. This session will also include two submitted talks by graduate students or recent PhDs. If you want your paper to be considered specifically for this special session please indicate so in your submission email.
Papers in any area of consciousness studies are welcome (construed widely so as to include philosophy of mind and philosophy of cognitive science, as well as the cognitive sciences) and should be roughly 3,000-4,000 words. Submissions made suitable for blind review should be sent to consciousnessonline@gmail.com by January 5th 2013.
For papers that are accepted, an audio/visual presentation (e.g. narrated powerpoint or video of talk) is strongly encouraged but not required.
Program Committee:
Richard Brown
David Chalmers
Adam Pautz
Susanna Siegel
For more information visit the conference website at http://consciousnessonline.com

Jerry Fodor interviewed

Jerry Fodor gets the Richard Marshall treatment at 3am Magazine:

http://www.3ammagazine.com/3am/words-without-sense-and-other-revolutions/

"JF: I’m increasingly unconvinced that the fuss about consciousness being the `hard problem’ has the stick by the right end. Consciousness is itself an intensional state; you can’t be just conscious tout court; if you are conscious at all, there must be something you are conscious of; and this `of’ is intensional and exhibits the usual substitution ambiguities. This is to say that the familiar claim (see eg. Searle) that materialist theories of intentionality beg the problem of consciousness gets things back to front. Still, even if, as I rather suppose, consciousness turns out to be more or less the same thing as attention, the questions about sensory content (`qualia’ ) have to be faced; but it’s at best unclear that they bear much on theories of cognition."

Friday, October 12, 2012

Mindfulness Meditation and Autonomy: A Buddhist Theory of Free Will by Rick Repetti

[T]he 'hard' metaphysical problem of free will may be explained in simple, metaphysically 'easy' causal/functional terms as a product of the mechanics of metacognitive mental causation: There seems to be a causal connection between the extent to which the mind can "go meta-", or loop back in reflectively on its own processes (e.g., think about its thoughts, prefer its desires, etc.), and self-regulation (autonomy, free will), evident in sensory-motor agility, biofeedback, and a host of related phenomena of an equally mundane nature.
The present research explores two new directions to this line of thought: (1) the extent to which mindfulness and other meditation practices increase self-regulation or autonomy, and (2) the extent to which one may develop a cogent version of a Buddhist theory of free will based on these ideas.