Friday, July 31, 2009

Fractal Sky

I was pleased to see fractals, especially the Sierpinski gasket, mentioned recently over at But I was disappointed that insufficient discussion was dedicated to explicating what it might mean for a printed text of finite length to implement, or approximate, or whatever, a fractal structure. So here’s my stab.

The Sierpinski gasket is infinitely decomposable into microstructures each of which mirrors the macrostructure above it--a triangular arrangement of one negative and three positive triangles each of which, the positives, consist of such an arrangement. So, one thing to look for in reading the text of IJ, is not just repeating structures, but repetitions that constitute the mirroring of the macro in the micro.

Of course, in a literal fractal there's an infinite decomposability that can be directly implemented in a literary fractal only if, for example, the text is printed in an infinite number of infinitely small characters.

Now, DFW is well aware of the various proposed solutions to the problem of literal infinities that have arisen in the history of math and philosophy. One way of conceiving of a finite entity as sufficing to represent an infinity is by conceiving it as a recipe that, if followed infinitely, has an infinite result. Infinite suds from just three words: "lather, rinse, repeat." Of course, the kind of infinity generated by the shampoo instruction isn’t fractal. To achieve that, it helps to have some sort of self-reference, as in, “Rewrite this very instruction with itself included as a terminating parenthetical remark.”

To wrap this up: my take on what's fractal-ish about IJ is that it, the text itself, presents a finite number of results of the implementation of a procedure which itself is represented in the text. The infinitely decomposable self-similar structure that is thereby represented is only approximated via the activity of reading (that is, following the procedure), and re-reading, and re-re-reading, the text.

Wednesday, July 29, 2009

Miracle Lecture

My plan for today's 2-hour Intro to Philosophy class was to spend the first of two parts on Hume's argument against the possibility of having more reason to believe that a miracle has occurred than to disbelieve it. About 15 minutes in I realized that the room was eraser-less. Fortunately, I had enough clean board to make it through to the mid-point coffee break. During break I went on an eraser hunt in nearby classrooms, and the included photograph shows what my search yielded.

Friday, July 24, 2009

Bodies and the sound of a mind coming apart

1. Bodies
I’m fascinated with the various remarks in IJ about bodies, and there’s a real mother lode (or better, “father lode”) in Winter B.S. 1960 – Tucson AZ garage scene with young J.O.I. and his dad.
For starters, there’s:
She treats bodies outside herself without respect or due care. (157)
The trick will be transcending that overlarge head, son. Learning to move just the way you already sit still. Living in your body. (158)
The stimulator of this car must know the car, Jim, feel it, be inside much more than just the …compartment. It’s an object, Jim, a body, but don’t let it fool you, sitting here, mute. (159) [compare to Hal’s book-opening muteness]
It’s a body and will respond with a well-oiled purr once I get some decent oil in her and all Mercuryish at up to 95 big ones per for just that driver who treats its body like his own, who feels the big steel body he’s inside, who uietly and unnoticed feels the nubbly plastic of the grip of the shift up next to the wheel when he shifts just as he feels the skin and flesh, the muscle and sinew and bone wrapped in gray spiderwebs of nerves in the blood-fed hand just as he feels the plastic and metal and flange and teeth, the pistons and rubber and rods of the amber-fueled Montclair, when he shifts. (159)

I find the car=body riff of Jim’s dad’s really cool. I’m reminded by it of one of my favorite parts of Grant Morrison’s comic series The Filth where, in issue 10, “man made god,” there’s a guy who self-induces religious hallucinations via temporal lobe seizure.

When I heard scientists declare they’d found the source of all religious experience, I didn’t join in all the stupid, theological debates. So what if “God” chose to show his face in the form of a seizure in the brain’s left temporal lobe, it was still God. Soon as I could afford it, I bought myself an electromagnetic generator which promised to induce temporal lobe epilepsy…. You know what happened when I wired myself up? I became a kind of limitless transparent presence, alive and self-aware and totally absorbed in the wonders of my own creativity. I was God, driving a car of raw muscle through the world I’d made. …This temporal lobe Buddha button is real, the ultimate transcendental experience is available to everyone! It’s right there in the head of every crack-eyed rapist and child murderer and broken-hearted depressive. (5)

Back to Jim’s dad:
Jim, a toast to our knowledge of bodies. To high-level tennis on the road of life. Ah. Oh. (159)

Compare to p. 54’s:
Like most North Americans of his generation, Hal tends to know way less about why he feels certain ways about the objects and pursuits he’s devoted to than he does about the objects and pursuits themselves. It’s hard to say for sure whether this is even exceptionally bad, this tendency.

Jim’s father to Jim, re: their respective generations:
We’re just bodies to you. We’re just bodies and shoulders and scarred knees and big bellies and empty wallets and flasks to you. (167-168)

So, after all of this long super-absorbing hypnotic ode to being aware of being a body, Jim’s father’s now expressing some ambivalence about his thesis, where being just a body is somewhat deprecating. One of the big payoffs, the big smack up side the head or punch in the gut that we’ve been set up for with all this car=body stuff is the wrenching description of the father’s fall:
A rude whip-lashing shove square in the back and my promising body with all its webs of nerves pulsing and firing was in full airborne flight and came down on my knees this flask is empty right down on my knees with all my weight and inertia on that scabrous hot sandpaper surface forced into what was an exact parody of an imitation of contemplative prayer, sliding forward. The flesh and then tissue and bone left twin tracks of brown red gray white like tire tracks of bodily gore extending from the service line to the net. (168)

Red and gray, by the way, are the tennis academy’s colors. Red and gray = heart and brain? As many have noted there’s a lot of anatomico-architectural parallelism with, for instance, the brainy MIT building, the cardioid layout of the tennis school. And also there’s the designation of “unit” as male sex-organ vs. Ennet House campus buildings on p. 201.

I was very much under the influence of this obsessing over bodies in my thinking about the following to gems:
Nets and fences can be mirrors. And between the nets and fences, opponents are also mirrors. This is why the whole thing is scary. This is why all opponents are scary and weaker opponents are especially scary. See yourself in your opponents. They will bring you to understand the Game. To accept the fact that the Game is about managed fear. That its object is to send from yourself what you hope will not return. (176)

Regarding E.T.A.’s version of the trivium and the quadrivium:
Plus also the six-term Entertainment Requirement because students hoping to prepare for careers as professional athletes are by intension training also to be entertainers, albeit of a deep and special sort, was Incandenza’s line, one of the few philosophical points he had to pretty much ram down the throats of both Avril and Schtitt, who was pushing hard for some mix of theology and the very grim ethics of Kant. (188)

So, what is anti-Kantian about the line that J.O.I. is pushing, a line he presumably inherits from his father? When I teach this sort of stuff to my undergrads, I focus on the opposition between utilitarians, for whom the maximization of happiness/pleasure (“joi”?) is the end justifying all means, and the Kantians, for whom such maximization is abhorrent, for a human should never be treated as a means to an end, but only as an end unto himself. That a human would be an entertainer, or an entertainment, is quite a squicky idea from a Kantian point of view. Ditto re squick for being just a body.

2. The sound of a mind coming apart
Bodies are things in space. But enough about space. Let’s talk about time. It’s common, of course, to comment on DFW’s use of endnotes and the deliberately disruptive effect on the flow of the reading experience. Note too what the primary psychedelic effects of DMZ are, they are, contra LSD primarily ontological and, especially, temporal. See p. 170 and alsot note 57. From the note:
…comparing himself on DMZ to a piece of like Futurist sculpture, plowing at high knottage through time itself, kinetic even in stasis, plowing temporally ahead, with time coming off him like water in sprays and wakes.

One of the ways in which DFW thinks out loud about time is through various sounds which are described as lying along a spectrum between the rhythmic and the lacking in rhythm.
At one end of the spectrum, there’s the finger drumming “without any kind of rhythm” on 176-177 which is “The sound of a fucking mind coming apart.” At an intermediate point of the spectrum is Madame Psychosis’s music which is “unpredictable and somehow rhythmic” (187 and also 190, 191) and utterly fascinating to Mario. At the other end of the spectrum, there’s this, which is just terrific:
By repeating this term over and over, perhaps in the same rhythm at which you squeeze a ball, you can reduce it to an empty series of phonemes, just formants and fricatives, trochaically stressed, signifying zip. (174)

Monday, July 20, 2009


There's a call for papers out for a conference on David Foster Wallace's work (link). Thanks, Maureen Eckert for turning me on to this.

The Graduate Center of the City University of New York is pleased to announce a one-day conference devoted to the discussion of Wallace’s work, to be held Friday, November 20th 2009, from 9 am to 5 pm. Please send your abstracts of no more than 250-words by August 15th, along with contact info and institutional affiliation (if any), to:
We welcome papers exploring any aspect of Wallace’s work. Some suggested directions:
1) Reconsideration of Wallace’s Oeuvre: Papers examining Wallace’s neglected early works Broom of the System and Girl with Curious Hair; new perspectives on Infinite Jest; the direction of Wallace’s later work.
2) Wallace’s Literary Context: The reception of Wallace’s work and the way his image has been shaped by his fans, the media, and the academy; examinations of Wallace’s relation to his literary forebears, both 20th century and earlier; Wallace outside the bounds of “postmodernism”; Wallace’s influence on contemporary literature.
3) Theorizing Wallace: Wallace’s treatment of language and formal or figurative qualities in Wallace’s writing; applications of narrative theory to Wallace’s texts or consideration of his narrative innovations; Wallace’s analytic, phenomenological, or existential contexts; treatment of the self and subjectivity; relation to ethics/values/morality; feminism and gender issues.
4) Interdisciplinary Approaches to Wallace: The use of math, logic, philosophy, science, technology, politics, sociology, psychology, law, etc. in Wallace’s work; pedagogical issues related to Wallace’s work.

Wednesday, July 15, 2009

Suck it up

I’ve noticed a lot of recent whining in the IJ-dedicated portions of the blogosphere about how hard and thus skippable the yrstruly section is. What I haven’t noticed enough of is how contrary to the athleticism that IJ is very much about said whining is. (I thought infinite summer participants were supposed to be “endurance bibliophiles.” Sheesh!)

Look, for instance, at what immediately precedes the yrstruly stuff. It’s Lyle! His shirt says “TRANSCEND” and “DEUS PROVIDEBIT.” And on p. 128, in the penultimate pgraph before yrstruly is launched, appears the rhetorical question that may just as well be asked of DFW himself (though sans the Spandex part, I guess): “What kind of guru wears Spandex and lives off others’ perspiration?” Anyone who paid for the privilege to even lug the big book around in DFW’s lifetime made him a guru living off of others' perspiration. But more than that, he wants you to work while you read it. The effort of the thing is a big part of the point and the ultimate payoff.

Moving backward from 128, other bits relevant to the present point include:

p. 118 “The point of repetition is there is no point. Wait until it soaks into the hardware and then see the way this frees up your head. A whole shitload of head-space you don’t need for the mechanics anymore, after they’ve sunk in. Now the mechanics are wired in. Hardwired in. This frees the head in the remarkablest ways. Just wait. You start thinking a whole different way now, playing.”

p. 115 “…the only way to get off one of the plateaus and climb up to the next one up ahead is with a whole lot of frustrating mindless repetitive practice and patience and hanging in there.”

p. 112 “SyberVision edits its visualization sequences with a melt-filter so Stan Smith’s follow-through loops seamlessly into his backswing for the exact same next stroke; the transitions are gauzy and dreamlike.”

p. 110 “You’re supposed to pretend it’s you on the bell-clear screen with the fluid and egoless strokes. You’re supposed to disappear into the loop and then carry that disappearance out with you, to play.”

I read the quoted material as, among other things, instructions for how to read IJ. So don’t, for instance, think of the yrstrly section as sorely lacking in punctuation. Think of it as edited with a melt-filter.

Tuesday, July 14, 2009

10 Great Mind and Brain Blogs

I guest-blogged at a guest top ten list of 10 great mind and brain blogs. Check it out. If you made the list of best bloggers blogging brainy blogs, help yourself to a best-brainy-blogger blog-badge here.

Wednesday, July 8, 2009

Surprise! Read an odd or even number of times

1. Infinite Jest and the spoiler-phillia/phobia debate

Entirely appropriate to the discussion of spoilers that cropped up here, as well as to the general question of the relevance of spoilerphobia wrt intentionally rereadable/rewatchable annular works such as IJ itself and the Entertainment, is this brand-new new article in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, The Paradox of Suspense by Aaron Smuts. Excerpt:

The ultimate success of Hollywood blockbusters is dependent upon
repeat viewings. Fans return to theaters to see films multiple times
and buy DVDs so they can watch movies yet again. Although it is
something of a received dogma in philosophy and psychology that
suspense requires uncertainty, many of the biggest box office
successes are action movies that fans claim to find suspenseful on
repeated viewings. The conflict between the theory of suspense and
the accounts of viewers generates a problem known as the paradox
of suspense
, which we can boil down to a simple question: If
suspense requires uncertainty, how can a viewer who knows the outcome
still feel suspense?


I will consider four different solutions to the paradox of suspense:
(1) the thought theory of entertained uncertainty, (2) the
desire-frustration theory of suspense, (3) the
moment-by-moment forgetting theory, and (4) the emotional
view. The thought theory of entertained
explains the paradox by denying that actual
uncertainty is necessary for suspense; instead, all that is required
is for viewers to engage the fiction as they normally
would—entertaining thoughts of the story as if they were
undecided. The desire-frustration theory holds that
uncertainty, entertained or actual, is not necessary for suspense. To
create suspense, one merely needs to frustrate a desire to affect the
outcome of an imminent event. The moment-by-moment forgetting
view is the position that while viewers are immersed in a fictional
scenario, they effectively cannot remember the outcome. The
emotional misidentification view holds that it is impossible
for viewers who know the outcome to feel suspense, and the best
explanation of the claims of audiences to the contrary is that
viewers must be confusing their actual fear and anxiety with what
they take to be suspense.

2. More on quote-unquote "quotation"

It looks like there's some evidence of authorial intent vindicating, somewhat, the nested-quote theory of DFW's use of single-quotes in IJ. See anony's remarks in the thread here. With this on my mind, I couldn't help but think that all the discussion of double- and triple-agency between Steeply and Marathe is somehow relevant.

3. Intracranial entrapment.

I continue to be interested in the 'stuck-in-the-head' theme I brought up here. Daryl Houston @Infinite Zombies has some nice remarks along these lines here.

4. Press 'Play'

p. 68, Hal's recurring dream: "We sort of play. But it's all hypothetical, somehow. Even the 'we' is theory: I never get to see the distant opponent, for all the apparatus of the game."

p. 72, Kate Gompert's suicidal motive: "'I didn't want to play anymore is all.' 'Play,' nodding in confirmation, making small quick notes."

p. 84, Schtitt's response to the question Mario somehow managed to articulate, "And then but so what's the difference between tennis and suicide, life and death, the game and its own end?": "'...No different, maybe,'[...]'Maybe no different, so' [...] 'Not different' [...] 'except the chance to play.'"

Dan Lloyd's Brain Music in New Scientist

Philosopher Dan Lloyd has developed a technique for creating musical files based on brain scans. The brain tunes allow for interesting comparisons between normal and abnormal activity. From a recent article in New Scientist:

To turn such scans into music, philosopher Dan Lloyd at Trinity College in Hartford, Connecticut, identified regions that become active together and assigned each of these groups a different pitch. He then created software that analyses a series of scans and generates the notes at these pitches as the corresponding brain areas light up. Each note is played at a volume that corresponds to the intensity of activity.

When Lloyd fed the software a set of scans of his own brain taken as he switched between driving a virtual-reality car and resting, he found that he could detect the switch-over in the sounds.

Lloyd then gave the software scans taken from volunteers with dementia and schizophrenia, and from healthy volunteers. The brains of people with schizophrenia switched between low and high activity more erratically than healthy brains, allowing the two types of brain to be distinguished by sound alone.

Tuesday, July 7, 2009


This strikes me as a pretty good idea. Behold, Neuroscience and the arts.

Increasingly, ideas, images and concepts of the neurosciences are being assimilated into global culture and becoming part of our daily discourses and practices.

Visual and digital technologies of the brain, the widespread dissemination of psychotropic drugs, expanding programs in consciousness studies and other neurotechnologies are having a significant impact on individuals and society.

These ongoing transformations in science and society are deeply pervading popular culture and are appearing in a profusion of media and artistic expanse- from the visual arts to film, theatre, novels and advertisements.

With this website, we explore and document past and current manifestations of this phenomenon and introduce an online platform for the analysis and exchange of cultural projects intersecting neuroscience, the arts and the humanities.

Hat tip: The Neuro Times

Friday, July 3, 2009

New Blog: Alternate Minds

I've started a new blog, Alternate Minds: Cognitive Science Fiction and Philosophy (, which will serve as a research repository for my Alternate Minds book project.

The aim of the Alternate Minds Project is to explore science fictional permutations of the concept of mind (and related concepts such as intelligence, perception, selfhood). By entertaining speculative scenarios wherein the target concepts are bent almost beyond recognition, we gain insights into the nature of mind and catch glimpses of new possibilities. Initial investigations will be clustered around seven key themes.

1. Virtual Minds are typically thought of as embedded in simulated environments and the minds themselves may be artificial. One intriguing question is whether there can be naturally occurring instances of virtual minds, or whether there must always be an artificial component that defines their virtuality.

2. Infinite Minds are minds infinite in one or more capacities, such as infinite intelligence, infinite perceptual acuity, or infinite will power. Of our various mental capacities that come in degrees, for which, if any, does it make sense to imagine versions that are infinite? Can we coherently conceive of, for example, a being with infinite will-power?

3. Group Minds are minds with proper parts that are themselves minds. Are any of our minds already proper parts of group minds? If there were group minds in our midst, how would we know?

4. Time-traveling Minds either literally move through time in non-standard ways or employ high degrees of computational power to simulate target events. What cognitive/computational advantages are there to intelligent systems that harness literal time-travel? From a computational point of view, what are the relative resource costs of literal versus simulated time-travel?

5. Hyper-spatial Minds: One of the most fun things to think about in contemplating minds inhabiting spaces of dimension n>3 are questions concerning the perceptual phenomenology of seeing (feeling, etc.) hyperspatial objects. What is it like to have four- (or five- or six-) dimensional eyes? In addition to these questions concerning hyperspatial sensory input, are interesting questions of output. What is it like to move a body though a hyperspatial manifold? Last, but not least, are questions concerning the computational processes mediating between inputs and outputs. What advantages and obstacles are presented to circuit-engineering a cognitive architecture where there are extra dimensions in which to wire things up.

6. Quantum Minds: The dominant approaches in contemporary cognitive science deal with minds within a classical physical framework. But what would consciousness and cognition be like if non-classical quantum principles played major roles in implementation. What would it be like to be an AI implemented on a quantum computer? What would it be like to be small enough or perceptually sensitive enough to directly perceive events occurring on quantum scales?

7. Anti-Minds are non-sapient, non-sentient systems with the capability to detect and destroy minds. They are either the ultimate evil or the ultimate protection against the dangerous effects of technologically advanced civilizations. One of the core questions raised in contemplating anti-minds is whether there can exist non-intelligent mechanisms for the detection of intelligence. Such mechanisms could be crucial in the search for extra-terrestrial intelligence.

Wednesday, July 1, 2009


1. Spoils

As mentioned previously, this is my second time through IJ. I should mention also, though I’m unlikely to mention it again, that as I think out loud here through this reread, there will be spoilers aplenty. I must confess to the following two deficits of character: I actually like spoilers and have difficulty mustering sympathy for those who do not. To those of you who aren’t always skipping to the end like me, this may very well be your last warning.

2. Notes on the beginning-end and some Moby Dick-ishness.

It hadn’t previously occurred to me that literal end of the (non-endnote) text (p. 981) and the chronological end of the story (p. 17) have Gately and Hal, respectively, both relatively aware of being trapped in their own heads (Hal’s “red cave,” for instance (which may as well be Plato’s)), peering outward, flat on their backs, and contemplating the sky. This peering out the head theme is something that I noticed a lot in Moby Dick, which I’ve read only recently. Another parallel to MD is the violence toward the sky in the Hal sequence (p. 16). Ahab threatened to stab the sun, I recall, and Hal observes cell phone antennae stabbing the sky and a jet’s contrail slicing blue sky-skin.

3. Infinite Rainbow

The sky-slicing aerial violence also makes me think of Pynchon’s opening, “a screaming came across the sky” in Gravity's Rainbow. Two other bits of GR-ish stuff in the early pages of IJ: (1) Ray Gunn and I are both convinced that IJ’s annular glyphs at section openings are evocative of GR’s “sprocket holes” (see here for Ray's nice remark about the glyphs of both authors as signals of unfilmability). (2) When, toward the end of their session, the conversationalist is going off about the polycarbonate found in both Hal’s racket and JOI’s cranial cartridge, the mutual proximity of descriptors like “polycarbonate,” “gyroscopic,” and “priapistic” just screams (across the sky!): “imipolex-g.” The confluence of cybernetics and pleasure embodied in GR’s Slothrop-hounding V2’s turn into IJ’s “entertainment” which, in varying degrees of literalness (with the excessively literal instance being JOI himself (“Himself”)), really gets inside one’s head.

4. Total Foreseen Horror

DFWs breathless super-long sentences are often put to their best effect in describing someone dying, leaving their body, and or, just transcending the local action. (See for example, the end of the essay “a supposedly fun thing…” where DFW ascends to bird’s eye view of the cruise ship, or the story in Oblivion about the victim of the scalding diaper). Consider the hilarious and terrible section on the paranoid schizophrenic (PS) in the show Orin is watching who, the PS, afraid of radio active fluids, is injected with such fluids and subjected to a PET scan. Here the sentential breathlessness is pressed into the service of conveying absolute terror (the PS ends up screaming his mind away). Note too the strange-loop-y-ness of what happens to the PS. The PET scan generates and image of the fear, a fear of radioactive fluids and large machines that, the object of the fear, is pretty much definitive of the processes of PET scanning.

5. On Quote Marks

A query and a theory.


See also this. And this:

funny pictures
moar funny pictures

John Bickle's Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience

I've just received my contributor's copy of The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience, edited by John Bickle. This is a project that I'm pretty excited about and I'm happy to finally see it in print. Here's the TOC:

Table of Contents
Notes on the Contributors
Editor's Introduction , John Bickle, (University of Cincinnati)
Part I: Explanation, Reduction, and Methodology in Neuroscientific Practice
1. Molecules, systems, and behavior: Another view of memory consolidation , William Bechtel, (University of California, San Diego)
2. Biological clocks: Explaining with models of mechanisms , Sarah K. Robins and Carl F. Craver, (Washington University, St. Louis)
3. Methodology and reduction in the behavioral neurosciences: Object exploration as a case study , Anthony Chemero and Charles J. Heyser, (Franklin and Marshall College)
4. The Science of Research and the search for molecular mechanisms of cognition , Alcino J. Silva, (University of California, Los Angeles) and John Bickle, (University of Cincinnati)
Part II: Learning and Memory
5. The lower bounds of cognition: What do spinal cords reveal? , Colin Allen, (Indiana University, Bloomington), Jim Grau, (Texas A&M University), and Mary Meagher, (Texas A&M University)
6. Lessons for cognitive science from neurogenomics , Alex Rosenberg, (Duke University)
7. Neuroscience, learning, and the return to behaviorism, , Peter Machamer, (University of Pittsburgh)
Part III: Sensation and Perception
8. fMRI: A modern cerebrascope? The case of pain , Valerie Gray Hardcastle, (University of Cincinnati) and C. Matthew Stewart, (Johns Hopkins University)
9. The enactive field, the embedded Neuron , Mazviita Chirimuuta, (Monash University, Australia) and Ian Gold, (McGill University)
10. The role of neurobiology in differentiating the senses , Brian L. Keeley, (Pitzer College)
11. Enactivism's vision: Neurocognitive basis or neurocognitively baseless? , Charles Wallis and Wayne Wright, (California State University, Long Beach)
Part IV: Neurocomputation and Neuroanatomy
12. Space, time, and objects , Rick Grush, (University of California, San Diego)
13. Neurocomputational models: Theory, application, philosophical consequences , Chris Eliasmith, (University of Waterloo)
14. Neuroanatomy and cosmology , Christopher Cherniak, (University of Maryland)
Part V: Neuroscience of Motivation, Decision Making, and Neuroethics
15. The emerging theory of motivation , Anthony Landreth, (University of California, Los Angeles)
16. Inference to the best decision , Patricia Smith Churchland, (University of California, San Diego)
17. Emergentism at the crossroads of philosophy, neurotechnology, and the enhancement debate , Eric Racine, (Institut de recherches cliniques de Montréal) and Judy Illes, (University of British Columbia)
18. What's neu in neuroethics? , Adina Roskies, (Dartmouth College)
Part VI: Neurophilosophy and Psychiatry
19. Confabulations about people and their limbs, present or absent , William Hirstein, (Elmhurst College)
20. Delusional experience , Jennifer Mundale, (University of Central Florida) and Shaun Gallagher, (University of Central Florida and University of Hertfordshire)
21. The case for animal emotions: Modeling neuropsychiatric disorders , Kenneth Sufka, (University of Mississippi), Morgan Weldon, (University of Mississippi), and Colin Allen, (Indiana University, Bloomington)
Part VII: Neurophilosophy
22. Levels and individual variation: Implications for the multiple realization of psychological properties , Ken Aizawa, (Centenary College of Louisiana) and Carl Gillett, (Northern Illinois University)
23. Neuro-eudaimonics, or Buddhists lead neuroscientists to the seat of happiness; Owen Flanagan, (Duke University)
24. The neurophilosophy of subjectivity , Peter Mandik, (William Paterson University

Neuro Images Tumblr Blog

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